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Abstract 
 
     This dissertation comprises three papers on the impacts of health insurance and taxation 
policies on individuals’ health care and labor market outcomes. The policy contexts include 
income tax subsidy reform, group health insurance regulation, and public health insurance 
expansion. In every chapter, I use state by year policy variation and individual level survey data 
to provide the effectiveness and efficiency cost analysis of these policies. 
     My first chapter presents new empirical evidence on the impact of tax subsidies for Health 
Savings Accounts (HSAs) on group insurance coverage. HSAs are tax-free health care 
expenditure savings accounts. Coupled with high deductible health insurance plans (HDHPs), 
they together represent new health insurance options. The tax advantage of HSAs expands the 
group health insurance market by making health care more affordable. Using individual level 
data from the Current Population Survey and exploiting policy variation by state and year from 
2004 to 2012, I find that HSA tax subsidies increase small-group coverage by a statistically 
significant 2.5 percentage points, although not coverage in larger firms. Moreover, if the tax 
price of HSA contribution decreases by 10 cents, small-group insurance coverage increases by 
almost 2 percentage points. I also find that for older workers or less-educated workers, HSA 
subsidies are associated with 2-3 percentage point increase in their group insurance coverage.  
     In the second chapter, I provide new empirical evidence on the impacts of state and federal 
mental health parity laws on related labor market outcomes, particularly working time. 
Implemented in the last two decades, these policies aim to eliminate differences in mental and 
physical health benefits among group health plans. The mandated benefits for mental health 
drive up the costs of providing health insurance substantially. In response, employers may avoid 
  
hiring more full-time workers, whose compensation includes health insurance, by increasing 
working time per worker and reliance on part-time employment, and employees have an 
incentive to increase their labor supply to qualify for the benefits. Using individual level data 
from the Current Population Survey and exploiting policy variation by state and year, I find state 
parity laws increase average weeks worked by 1.4%. Since self-insured firms are exempted from 
state regulations, parity is estimated to have nearly twice as large an effect on small firms as it 
does on large firms. Moreover, I study two federal parity laws and find the more expansive one 
is associated with 1.7% more weeks worked. Overall, there is no strong evidence that parity laws 
affect hours worked and prevalence of coverage significantly.  
     The third chapter examines the effect of public health insurance expansions during 1997-2002 
on the mental and behavioral health of children. Using three waves of the National Survey of 
America’s Families (NSAF) and legislative State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 
income eligibility thresholds by state-year-age, we explore the causal impact of SCHIP 
generosity on participation, general health care utilization, mental health service utilization, and 
finally children’s mental and behavioral health measures. Our results first show that SCHIP 
thresholds significantly increased public health insurance coverage and general health care 
utilization. However, there is almost no statistically significant evidence of increases in mental 
health care utilization or improvements in general mental health outcomes for the whole sample, 
When we focus on the Assessing the New Federalism (ANF) “study states” that comprise the 
bulk of the NSAF sample, we find a bit more evidence that SCHIP expansions may have slightly  
increased the probability of receiving mental health care as well as a few specific mental health 
outcomes for some age groups, but overall estimated effects remain small. 
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1. Introduction 
     In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a large and growing number of uninsured 
individuals is one trend in the US health care market concerned by policy makers, despite 
significant expansions of public insurance and generous subsidies to group insurance premiums. 
48 million Americans in 2012, or 15.4% of the non-elderly population, were without health 
insurance coverage (Census Population Report, U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). Another trend is that 
health care spending has been rising faster than income growth. Thus, the reform about health 
insurance system that would address these issues has been politically salient. 
     To help individuals save for future health care expenditures, be more sensitive to medical care 
costs, as well as expand their health insurance coverage, the federal government established 
Health Saving Accounts (HSAs) in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act (MMA) in 2003. The establishment of HSAs is one of the most significant 
tax reforms impacting health insurance coverage since 1954, when the group insurance tax 
exemption was codified.1 Individuals or families can contribute to these income tax-free 
accounts to save for their future health care when they purchase eligible high-deductible health 
plans (HDHPs). This tax program shifts part of tax subsidies from the premium component of 
traditional contracts to the out-of-pocket component of HDHPs, because HDHPs typically have 
much lower premiums than traditional plans and all the tax-preferred contributions to HSA 
accounts can be used as qualified out-of-pocket health spending.2 
                                                          
1 Health insurance premiums paid by employers are exempted from income and payroll taxes. 
2 Health insurance deductible and qualified medical expenses, including those not covered by the health insurance, 
like dental and vision care. 
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     As the leading source of health insurance in America, the group insurance market may be 
expanded by HSA income tax subsidies through both the employer and employee margins. From 
the employer side, employers are more likely to provide HDHPs to their employees for better 
consumer engagement and cost control through HSAs regulation. Especially for small firms that 
do not have large risk pools and cannot provide comprehensive plans, HSA-eligible HDHPs 
(HSA/HDHPs) are a low cost choice for them.3 In 2006, 33 percent of HSA/HDHP enrollment 
was in small companies that did not offer any insurance coverage previously (Washington: 
America’s Health Insurance Plans, Center for Policy and Research, 2006). As for the employee 
side, the low premiums of HDHPs paired with the tax break of HSAs may attract some 
employees who have access to but do not take up group insurance. They may want to take 
advantage of these subsidies and this target group counts roughly one-quarter of the uninsured 
population (Gruber, 2005). 
     This paper assesses whether the establishment of HSA income tax subsidies expands group 
insurance coverage. There is little empirical evidence on this issue; also in past work on its 
theoretical framework or policy debates based on descriptive data, there exists controversy. As 
discussed in greater detail below, I merge state by year policy variation to Current Population 
Survey (CPS) March supplement data at individual level to identify the effect of HSA subsidies 
on group insurance coverage. Federal law implemented the federal income tax exemption for the 
contributions to HSA accounts, but state governments can choose to mirror federal tax treatment 
by offering state income tax exemptions or not. Thus, this variation in state legislation across 
several years provides an excellent laboratory for learning the causal effect between provision of 
                                                          
3 The design of HSA/HDHPs redistributes risk burden away from insurance pool and toward self-insurance of 
household. 
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HSA state income tax subsidies and probability of being group insurance covered. In my 
empirical analysis, I rely on both the treatment-state dummy and the state parameterized HSA 
tax price.  
     My results indicate that HSA state income subsidies increase workplace coverage for workers 
who are between 55 and 64 years old by 2.6 percentage points. In addition, HSA subsidies 
increase the small-group insurance coverage by 2.5 percentage points, and workers with high 
school diplomas or lower educational level also experience more than 2 percentage point 
increase in coverage when having HSA state subsidies. As for parameterized estimation, I find 
that a ten cents decrease in HSA tax price increases the group insurance coverage for workers in 
small firms by 1.8 percentage points, also increases coverage for workers with low educational 
level by around 3 percentage points. I further find the estimates are statistically significant, 
consistent using alternative specifications, and robust to sensitivity checks. Changes in coverage 
reflect the net result of changes in both employer offering and employee take-up, which cannot 
be distinguished empirically in this work because of data limitations.  
     The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I introduce HSAs and related state 
legislation, the health care cost structure of HSA/HDHPs and the tax price of HSA contributions. 
Following a review of previous literature in section 3, data and methodology are presented in 
section 4. In section 5, I provide the results on the overall effect on group insurance coverage, 
and the estimated effects of HSA subsidies for different age groups, firm sizes and education 
levels. Section 6 checks the identification assumption and sensitivity of the results. Section 7 
concludes. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Introduction of HSAs and state legislation 
     Health Savings Accounts are tax-free financial accounts that help individuals save for medical 
care expenses, established by federal law in 2003. People under age 65 who are covered by 
eligible high-deductible health insurance plans can simultaneously make tax-free contributions to 
HSAs. For 2012, HSA-eligible HDHPs must have at least a $1250 deductible for individual 
plans, and $2500 for family plans. Qualified individuals can annually contribute at most $3100 
or the amount of their HDHP deductible, whichever is lower. Under qualified family plans, the 
annual maximum contribution is $6250 or the amount of their HDHP deductible, whichever is 
lower. If the ages of HSA holders are 55 and over, they can make additional catch-up 
contributions set at $700 in 2006 and rising by $100 annually until freezing at $1000 in 2010 
(National Conference of State Legislatures and U.S. Department of Treasury, 2012).4  
     HSAs have three tax exemptions if withdrawals are used to pay for health care. First, HSA 
deposits are not subject to personal income tax. Similar to other tax-preferred savings vehicles 
such as ordinary IRAs or 401 (k) retirement plans, contributions to HSAs are deductible from 
taxable income.5 Their relative advantage is therefore larger for people in higher tax brackets. 
Second, as long as the withdrawals from HSAs are used for medical expenses, they are tax-free. 
But all withdrawals from IRA and 401 (k) are taxable. Nonmedical HSA withdrawals before age 
65 are treated as taxable income and subject to a 20% tax penalty unless account holders have 
become disabled or deceased. After the date when the account holders turn 65, the penalty does 
                                                          
4 Two highly useful guides for HSAs can be found at http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/hsas-health-savings-
accounts.aspx and http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/taxes/pages/health-savings-accounts.aspx 
5 IRAs and 401(k) plans are both defined contribution retirement plans. Contributions and earnings are tax-free, but 
withdrawals are taxable. 
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not apply.6 Finally, unwithdrawn funds in HSA accounts can be accumulated and used in future 
years; the savings can be rolled over and the interest earnings on these deposits are also tax-free. 
Therefore, HSAs can be used as a more advantageous health care savings vehicle relative to 
Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs).7 
     HSAs are an expansion and evolution of Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs), which were in a 
federal pilot program and launched in over 20 states in the mid-1990s. Compared to HSAs, 
MSAs had tighter limits on eligibility and contribution amount,8 also the market of MSA-eligible 
plans had only a very small share, especially in the group insurance market. Since the 
implementation of HSAs, the enrollment in HDHPs has been steadily growing. Panel A in Fig. 1 
shows that the total number of people covered by HSA/HDHPs grew from 0.44 million in 2004 
to 13.5 million in 2012. Among them, the enrollment in the group market increased from 0.31 
million in 2004 to 11 million in 2012. The graph also shows that the increasing trend in 
HSA/HDHP enrollment after 2006 is mostly coming from the growth of group market instead of 
individual market. (Washington: America’s Health Insurance Plans, Center for Policy and 
Research).9 
                                                          
6 More useful information about HSAs penalty can be found at http://www.hsacenter.com/faqs.html 
7 FSAs allow employees to use pretax dollars to pay for health care, but any dollars remaining in accounts at the end 
of the year are forfeited to employer. And nonmedical withdrawals are not allowed.  
8 MSAs are only available for self-employed individuals and small firm employees, and they have higher 
requirements on deductibles and lower contribution limits. MSAs have been replaced by HSAs since 2003. 
9 One highly useful link about HSA/HDHPs enrollment is: http://www.ahip.org/HSA2013/ 
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Fig. 1. Facts about the HSA/HDHP market. Notes: In panel A, the total covered lives including all types of the group 
and individual markets come from responding companies. In panel B, the sample based on the universe of firms 
obtained from the U.S. Census. Firm offering rates of HDHPs are defined as a percent of firms offering health benefits. 
And they are weighted by firms.10 Workers take-up rates are also defined as a percent of group insurance covered 
workers. No data for employees enroll in 2005. 
     Panel B in Fig. 1 illustrates the upward trends in the percentage of firms offering and workers 
enrolling in HSA/HDHPs between 2005 and 2012. Among firms that offered health insurance 
coverage to their employees, the offering rate of HSA/HDHPs increased faster than its take-up 
rate among workplace covered workers, especially from 2010 to 2012 (The Kaiser Family 
Foundation and Health Research & Education Trust). 
     Upon passage of the federal law, state laws and regulations took steps to promote the use of 
HSAs by complying with the federal guidelines and providing state income tax exemptions for 
HSA contributions. From 2003 to 2011, 39 states enacted laws to implement state income tax-
free HSAs; the other states did not do so during this period (including the 9 states without a state 
                                                          
10 One highly useful link about the weighting and statistical significance is: http://kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2014-
methodology/ 
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income tax). Table 1 describes the regulatory regime in each state based on data from the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, Groom Law Group, and specific state laws and 
statutes.  
     HSAs are still playing a role after the full implementation of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in 2014. This new health care reform, which was passed by 
Congress and signed into law by the president in 2010, specifies that the threshold of qualified 
insurance coverage accommodates the existing HSA plan limits. To be specific, HSA/HDHPs 
are compatible with many bronze and silver level PPACA plans.11 HSA-eligible plans have 
already gained popularity in recent years, and their availability may be expanded further since 
consumers need to control cost after implication of mandated “minimum essential coverage” 
more than ever.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 PPACA allows four different levels of health coverage to be offered inside the health insurance exchanges: 
platinum, gold, silver and bronze. 
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Table 1  
Time of state HSAs legislation: 2003-2011 
States HSAs States HSAs States HSAs 
AK No KY 2005 NY 2004 
AL* No LA 2003 OH 2003 
AR 2005 MA 2005 OK 2003 
AZ 2003 MD 2003 OR 2003 
CA No ME 2006 PA 2006 
CO 2003 MI 2003 RI 2004 
CT 2004 MN 2005 SC 2004 
DC 2003 MO 2003 SD* No 
DE 2004 MS 2005 TN* No 
FL* No MT 2003 TX* No 
GA 2004 NC 2004 UT 2003 
HI 2004 ND 2004 VA 2003 
IA 2004 NE 2004 VT 2004 
ID 2004 NH* No WA* No 
IL 2003 NJ No WI 2011 
IN 2003 NM 2003 WV 2003 
KS 2004 NV* No WY* No 
*State has no income tax 
 
2.2 The structure of health insurance costs and tax price of HSA/HDHPs      
     HSA tax subsidies for out-of-pocket component change the structure of health care costs 
relative to traditional health plans. Richardson and Seligman (2007) examine this structure 
change by providing a one-period framework under employer-sponsored traditional plans as well 
as HSA/HDHPs.12 With the income tax exemption for employers’ contributions to premiums, the 
individual’s expected health care costs of traditional contracts are: 
                                                          
12 Overall, they find that HSAs are limited in their ability to affect health care spending, and the effect of HSAs on 
the health care market is largely unknown. 
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                𝐸(𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) = 𝛼𝑃(1 − 𝜏𝐼 − 𝜏𝑆) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑃 + 𝐸(min(𝑇, 𝐷) + 𝑐(max(𝑇 − 𝐷, 0)))         (1) 
In equation (1), the employer payment is 𝛼𝑃(1 − 𝜏𝐼 − 𝜏𝑆): 𝑃 is premium, 𝛼 represents the 
proportion of the premium paid by employer, with 𝜏𝐼 and 𝜏𝑆 representing marginal income and 
payroll tax rate. The rest should be paid by employee:  𝑇 is defined as total expenditures on 
individual medical care, 𝐷 as deductible level. Finally, 𝑐 stands for co-insurance rate. Under such 
a health insurance contract, the premium part is a fixed component, and the expected out-of-
pocket cost depends on the magnitude of 𝑇 and 𝐷.  If 𝑇 is smaller than 𝐷, the out-of-pocket cost 
equals 𝑇, otherwise it will be the sum of deductible and co-insurance. 
     However, if workers take HSA/HDHPs from workplace and use HSA contributions to pay 
their out-of-pocket cost of health care, the expected health costs become:  
   ?̂?(𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) = 𝛼?̂?(1 − 𝜏𝐼 − 𝜏𝑆) + (1 − 𝛼)?̂? + 𝐸(min(𝑇, ?̂?) (1 − 𝜏𝐼) + 𝑐(max(𝑇 − ?̂?, 0)))      (2) 
where ?̂? and ?̂? indicate the premium and deductible for HDHPs. The differences between 
formula (1) and (2) show us the structure change of health care costs due to HSA tax subsidies: 
the tax subsidies apply to both premium and out-of-pocket component.13 Since by the HSA 
eligibility ?̂? < 𝑃 and  𝐷 ̂ > 𝐷, HSAs induce a transfer of tax subsidies from the premium 
component to the out-of-pocket component. In this context, people’s responses to HSAs depend 
on the change in premium, deductible and tax subsidies jointly. 
     To measure the size of out-of-pocket tax subsidies, I follow the existing literature and define 
the “tax price” of HSA contributions as the cost of a dollar of such contributions in terms of 
                                                          
13 The contributions made by individuals are deductible from income tax but not payroll taxes, while employers’ 
contributions to HSAs are excluded from both income tax and employment tax. I only show the former case. And for 
expected costs of one-period, the contributions to HSAs cannot exceed the deductible. Thus in equation (2), co-
insurance part is not income tax exempted even though it also belongs to out-of-pocket cost. 
11 
 
current after-tax consumption. Since some states offer parallel tax treatment following federal 
law while some states don’t, the tax price of HSAs in one period must be separated into two 
types. Letting 𝜏𝐹 denote the federal marginal income tax rate and 𝜏𝑆 denote the state marginal 
income tax rate, the tax price of HSAs in states having both federal and state income tax 
exemptions is therefore given by the following: 
                                                   Tax price=1 − 𝜏𝐹 − 𝜏𝑆                                                                          (3) 
In other states, the absence of state income tax exemptions increases the tax price of HSAs; their 
HSA tax price is:  
                                                      Tax price=1 − 𝜏𝐹                                                                               (4) 
3. Literature review 
     Tax subsidies for health insurance premiums increase both coverage and plan generosity. 
Most of the approaches that identify the effect of tax subsides use an exogenous policy shock or 
after-tax price of health insurance. Supporting empirical evidence has been found in the group 
market as well as the individual market. For the group market, increasing tax subsidies for 
premiums increases coverage and offering rate (and vice versa). In addition, the effect of tax 
subsidies is substantially greater for small firms and the negative after-tax price elasticity of 
insurance coverage is also driven by small firms. (Royalty, 1999; Finkelstein, 2002; Gruber and 
Lettau, 2004; Gruber and Washington, 2005). For the individual market, Heim and Lurie (2009) 
estimate the effect of increasing health insurance premiums’ tax deductibility for self-employed 
people on their insurance purchase, and they find negative take-up elasticity with respect to the 
tax price on both the extensive and intensive margins. 
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     Combined with HDHPs, HSAs are one kind of tax subsidies eligible for both group health 
plans and non-group health plans, so they could impact both of the markets. Consider the group 
market first; HSAs partly shift previous tax subsidies away from the premium to the out-of-
pocket component. On one hand, HSA/HDHPs provide less risk to future compensation costs 
than high premium traditional insurance and make coverage more affordable, thus they may 
expand employer-provided health insurance coverage, especially for the small-group market 
(Cannon, 2006; Richardson and Seligman, 2007). On the other hand, Blumberg (2004) and Glied 
and Remler (2005) argue that HSAs may not have a substantial impact on expanding group 
insurance coverage, even damaging the small-group market when there is a death spiral of 
premium and high administrative costs.14 Consider the individual market then, the empirical 
evidence on the impact of HSA subsidies is limited. The tax treatment for HSAs seems like a 
pure benefit because many people in the individual market have already purchased HSA-eligible 
health plans. And the availability of such tax subsidies may stimulate the non-group market 
further (Pauly and Nichols, 2002).  
     In most of the literature about consumer choice of Consumer-Driven Health Plans (CDHPs),15 
healthy older people with high income are more likely to choose these plans because they are 
great saving vehicles. And CDHP enrollees also have substantially higher educational attainment 
than others (Zabinski, Sleden, Moeller and Banthin, 1998; Burman, 1999; Pauly and Herring, 
2000; Parente, Feldman and Christianson, 2004; Greene, Hibbard, Dixon and Tusler, 2006). 
However, Cardon and Showalter (2006) use an infinite horizon utility maximization model to 
                                                          
14  This “death spiral” would be caused by adverse selection that shifts healthy workers out of traditional plans and 
into high-deductible plans. 
15 HSAs or MSAs (pre-HSAs) laws are closely tied to HDHPs, and they are referred jointly as “Consumer-Driven 
Health Plans” (CDHPs). 
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show that sick people can also be better off with HSAs. Besides, Cannon (2007) suggests that 
HSAs are also attractive to low income people. Since the premium of HSA/HDHPs is much 
lower and its growth rate is much slower than traditional insurance, HSA-compatible coverage is 
more affordable for them. As for the future of HSAs, especially following ACA implementation, 
Parente and Feldman (2007) predict that HSAs will still be desirable in both the group and 
individual market.  
      However, the empirical evidence on the effect of HSA subsidies on insurance coverage and 
how this effect varies across different types of workers is still lacking. My study adds to 
literature in two ways. First, by using policy variation in HSA state income tax exemptions 
merged with nationally representative individual level data, I am able to identify the effect of 
HSA subsidies on group insurance coverage directly. Second, I also estimate whether certain 
types of workers are more likely to gain group insurance coverage in response to the 
establishment of HSA state tax subsidies. A comprehensive empirical analysis of the variation in 
effects among different age groups, firm sizes and educational levels is provided in this work.  
4. Data and Methodology 
     The analysis in this paper is based primarily on repeated cross-sectional data from the 2004 to 
2012 Current Population Survey’s March supplement. I restrict the sample to individuals aged 
25-64 who have employment and are not covered by Medicaid. Limiting to prime-age employees 
eliminates changes in coverage due to school enrollment, parents’ coverage or retirement. The 
reason I drop the Medicaid-covered sample is that HSA enrollees cannot be covered by another 
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health plan.16 Generally, the Medicaid-eligible income level is too low to allow individuals to 
benefit from an income tax exemption, so they are unlikely to give up Medicaid coverage for 
HSA/HDHPs. Besides abundant individual characteristics, the data indicates whether those 
surveyed were covered by group insurance last year. In Table 2, I report summary statistics for 
the entire sample and the states with and without access to HSA subsidies separately. For both 
HSA states and non-HSA states, I also present the weighted means for three subsamples: 
workers between 55 and 64 years old, workers from small firms that have fewer than 100 
employees, and workers with high school diplomas or lower. As expected, older workers have 
fewer young children, higher percentage of marriage, and worse health status. Workers in small 
firms are more likely to be male, white, and less likely to be unionized. Less educated workers 
tend to be non-white, single, and in poor health. HSA states have higher group health insurance 
coverage than non-HSA states, not only for the whole sample, but also for three subsamples. 
Differences in other demographic characteristics between HSA states and non-HSA states are not 
striking. 
                                                          
16 4% of the whole sample has Medicaid coverage. Adding back the Medicaid population, the results do not change 
much, all estimators are similar or slightly smaller compare to the results I report in Part five. The results including 
Medicaid population are available upon request.  
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Table 2:           
Summary Statistics: weighted means  
       
   All states (51)  HSA states (39) Non-HSA states (12) 
  
All Age 55-64 Employees<100 
High school 
or lower 
All Age 55-64 Employees<100 
High school 
or lower 
Group coverage 0.765 0.790 0.817 0.661 0.699 0.721 0.762 0.563 0.588 
 (0.424) (0.407) (0.386) (0.473) (0.459) (0.449) (0.426) (0.496) (0.492) 
Age 43.195 43.349 58.683 43.584 43.858 42.925 58.700 43.066 42.483 
 (10.631) (10.630) (2.719) (10.687) (10.505) (10.629) (2.730) (10.638) (10.491) 
Male 0.533 0.526 0.517 0.567 0.573 0.545 0.527 0.590 0.593 
 (0.499) (0.500) (0.500) (0.495) (0.495) (0.498) (0.499) (0.492) (0.491) 
Non-white 0.178 0.170 0.134 0.140 0.185 0.192 0.158 0.159 0.173 
 (0.383) (0.376) (0.341) (0.347) (0.388) (0.394) (0.365) (0.365) (0.378) 
Married 0.644 0.651 0.720 0.660 0.622 0.632 0.696 0.638 0.609 
 (0.479) (0.477) (0.449) (0.474) (0.485) (0.482) (0.460) (0.481) (0.488) 
Full time 0.878 0.876 0.844 0.831 0.874 0.881 0.853 0.839 0.880 
 (0.327) (0.330) (0.363) (0.375) (0.332) (0.323) (0.355) (0.368) (0.325) 
Union member 0.154 0.158 0.187 0.073 0.154 0.147 0.174 0.058 0.119 
 (0.361) (0.365) (0.390) (0.261) (0.361) (0.354) (0.379) (0.234) (0.323) 
Children under 5 0.171 0.173 0.005 0.169 0.133 0.169 0.008 0.164 0.157 
 (0.468) (0.472) (0.088) (0.469) (0.418) (0.462) (0.103) (0.454) (0.443) 
Spouse employment 0.488 0.503 0.503 0.511 0.455 0.461 0.468 0.459 0.405 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.386) (0.498) (0.499) (0.499) (0.498) (0.491) 
Health Status 2.062 2.048 2.279 2.060 2.248 2.085 2.289 2.103 2.271 
 (0.917) (0.909) (0.947) (0.919) (0.928) (0.931) (0.963) (0.941) (0.950) 
N 692230 465683 73573 187747 166241 226547 34881 96443 85255 
Notes: Supplement weights are used. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Sample used is pooled CPS March supplement from 2004 to 2012. 
Observations restricted to workers between age 25 and 64 without Medicaid.  Health Status is an integral from 1-5, where 1 represents excellent health 
and 5 represents poor health. 
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     I estimate the effect of HSA tax subsidies by assessing the change in coverage of workers in 
states with HSA subsidies from before to after policy adoption, and comparing it to the change in 
coverage of workers in states that do not provide HSA state income exemptions. To control for 
other determinants of coverage, I use the basic estimating equation as follows: 
                                                𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑆𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖)                                         (5) 
In this equation, the dependent variable  𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a binary measure of whether the worker 𝑖 in state 
𝑗 is covered by group insurance reported in year 𝑡.17 I code a state as having HSA state income 
tax exemptions in year 𝑡 if they have been effective by the last day of year 𝑡 − 1, thus 𝐻𝑆𝐴𝑗𝑡−1  is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if state has HSA state tax exemptions, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  indexes a set of individual level characteristics: age, gender, educational attainment, race, 
marital status, the number of children under 5, union membership, full time versus part time 
work, self-reported health status, firm size and occupation. The regression specification includes 
state fixed effects 𝛾𝑗, to control for any differences across states in group coverage patterns, 
including any coverage differences between the states that adopted HSA subsidies and those that 
did not. It also includes year fixed effects 𝛿𝑡 to capture any national trends in coverage. The 
coefficient 𝛽1 represents the effect of HSA state income tax subsidies on group insurance 
coverage. 
     This method provides consistent results based on the identifying assumption that absent HSA 
state income tax subsidies, coverage in HSA states and non-HSA states would have followed 
similar trends between 2004 and 2012. To check the validity of this assumption, I first examine 
                                                          
17 The group insurance is sold in year t-1 and reported in year t. 
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whether group coverage in treatment states prior to state legislation of HSA subsidies is 
following a similar time trend to the coverage in control states. Second, I examine whether a 
state’s adoption of HSA state subsidies in a certain year is influenced by the previous insurance 
coverage time trend. As a further check, the differences in the insurance coverage between 
different worker types are also plotted, for both HSA states and non-HSA states. By doing this, I 
can test if the trends in the coverage gap between worker types picked up through HSA subsidies 
exist before policy adoption. Relevant graphs and discussions are reported in section 7 following 
the main results. 
     The indicator for group coverage reflects information on employer offering combined with 
information on employee take-up. Recall that both the supply and demand side could be affected 
by the tax subsidies, therefore the coefficient 𝛽1 measures the combined equilibrium effect of 
HSAs on both of these two margins. It is difficult to estimate the separate effect for lack of firm 
level data. Ideally, I could test whether the effect of HSAs on group insurance coverage actually 
comes from the effect of HSAs on high-deductible group insurance coverage, but the data about 
coverage does not indicate what kind of health plan the workers have. This means I can only 
estimate the final effect of HSA tax subsidies on total group coverage. 
5. Results 
5.1 Basic results 
     The regression results for equation (5) are reported in Table 3; the estimates are from non-
linear probit and linear regression, weighted to make the sample nationally representative. The 
standard errors are clustered at state level in order to control for autocorrelation within states 
over time. Since the probit coefficients are not directly interpretable, column (1) instead shows 
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the associated marginal effects and their standard errors. It shows that HSA state tax subsidies do 
not have a statistically significant effect on total group coverage, and the estimate is positive and 
small. In column (2), the result from the linear probability model is very similar, with a 
coefficient of 0.008 and confidence interval that is too wide to be significant at the 10% level. 
The covariates in the model have their expected effects. Being married, more educated, or having 
a spouse who has employment increases the probability of being covered by group insurance. 
But being non-white or working in a small firm lowers the coverage. 
     The insignificant results for the full sample may be due to a lot of unaffected people. HSA 
state income subsidies may only have noticeable impacts for some specific age groups. One 
hypothesis is that younger workers are more likely to be affected because they are healthier, in 
that case, a low premium could make HSA/HDHP plan a suitable choice for them. Another 
hypothesis notes that older workers would be more willing to save for medical expenditures, so 
HSAs, such a tax exempted saving vehicle for health care spending, would be more attractive for 
them. In particular, it is relevant for workers aged 55-64, since they can also have extra tax-free 
contributions to their HSA accounts, called catch-up contributions. In order to take this 
opportunity, there may be favorable selection of workers in this age group into employer-
provided HDHP plans. 
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Table 3     
Effect of HSA subsidies on probability of coverage by group health insurance  
  (1)Probit  (2)OLS 
HSAs  0.006  0.008 
  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Age 25-29  -0.101***  -0.121*** 
  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Age 30-34  -0.063***  -0.072*** 
  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Age 35-39  -0.052***  -0.058*** 
  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Age 40-44  -0.045***  -0.049*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Age 45-49  -0.023***  -0.026*** 
  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Age 50-54  -0.001  -0.010** 
  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Age 55-59  0.001  -0.006 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Male  -0.013***  -0.017*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Non-white  -0.035***  -0.037*** 
  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Married  0.031***  0.044*** 
  (0.005)  (0.006) 
High school  0.107***  0.182*** 
  (0.005)  (0.010) 
Some college  0.136***  0.216*** 
  (0.006)  (0.012) 
Bachelor or higher  0.165***  0.239*** 
  (0.008)  (0.014) 
Full time  0.127***  0.159*** 
  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Union member  0.099***  0.078*** 
  (0.007)  (0.008) 
< 10 employees  -0.185***  -0.240*** 
  (0.008)  (0.011) 
10-24 employees  -0.118***  -0.136*** 
  (0.009)  (0.011) 
25-99 employees  -0.060***  -0.056*** 
  (0.009)  (0.009) 
100-499 employees  -0.019**  -0.013 
  (0.009)  (0.008) 
>1000 employees  0.005  0.005 
  (0.007)  (0.005) 
Children under 5  0.011***  0.010*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Spouse employment  0.102***  0.096*** 
  (0.006)  (0.008) 
N  105971  105971 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and they are adjusted for 51 clusters in state. Standard errors of marginal 
effects are calculated using “delta method”. Omitted age category is “age 60-64”. Omitted education category is 
“lower than high school”. Omitted firm size category is “500-999 employees”. All regressions include occupation 
dummies, health status dummies and a full set of state and year fixed effects. Regressions are weighted. 
 *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
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     To examine whether certain age groups of workers are more likely to gain group insurance 
coverage in response to HSA state tax subsidies, I estimate equation (5) separately for 4 different 
age groups of workers in 10-year age intervals. Table 4 reports the results. Column (1) to column 
(4) present the marginal effects of all explanatory variables translated from the probit model. 
Among the results of all age groups, I find that HSA income tax subsidies only have a 
statistically significant effect on the oldest one. Having these subsidies leads to an average 2.6 
percentage point increase in coverage by group health insurance for workers aged 55-64 
(statistically significant at the 5% level). To check the sensitivity of this estimator, column (5) 
provides a linear estimate which is consistent with probit in magnitude and statistical power.18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
                                                          
18 In results not reported here, I find the statistically insignificant estimates for HSAs for age group (1), (2) and (3) are 
also robust to OLS estimations.  
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Table 4 
Effect of HSA subsidies on group insurance coverage for different ages of workers  
 
 (1)Probit (2)Probit (3)Probit (4)Probit (5)OLS 
 Age 25-34 Age 35-44 Age 45-54 Age 55-64 Age 55-64 
HSAs -0.004 -0.001 0.011 0.026** 0.027** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
Male -0.024*** -0.004 -0.010* 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Non-white -0.032*** -0.028*** -0.045*** -0.040*** -0.046*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) 
Married 0.020* 0.023*** 0.029*** 0.045*** 0.057*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
High school 0.134*** 0.125*** 0.089*** 0.067*** 0.112*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.020) 
Some college 0.188*** 0.155*** 0.102*** 0.085*** 0.130*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) 
Bachelor or higher 0.237*** 0.190*** 0.116*** 0.096*** 0.138*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.022) 
Full time 0.168*** 0.119*** 0.105*** 0.111*** 0.149*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) 
Union member 0.127*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.058*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
< 10 employees -0.181*** -0.212*** -0.184*** -0.146*** -0.201*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.022) 
10-24 employees -0.123*** -0.139*** -0.120*** -0.082*** -0.092*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
25-99 employees -0.057*** -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.038** -0.037** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) 
100-499 employees -0.012 -0.032** -0.027** -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) 
>1000 employees 0.012 -0.003 -0.004 0.018 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) 
Children under 5 0.015*** 0.017*** -0.015 0.010 0.013 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.032) (0.031) 
Spouse employment 0.145*** 0.119*** 0.087*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) 
N 26401 30077 30973 18520 18250 
Mean coverage 0.699 0.769 0.799 0.798  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and they are adjusted for 51 clusters in state. Standard errors of marginal 
effects are calculated using “delta method”. Omitted education category is “lower than high school”. Omitted firm 
size category is “500-999 employees”. All regressions also include health status dummies, occupation dummies, and 
a full set of state and year fixed effects. Regressions are weighted. The Last row reports the mean level of group 
insurance coverage for each age group.  
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
22 
 
5.2 The role of HSA subsidies in small-group 
     We have seen that HSA income tax subsidies coincide with an increase in group insurance 
coverage for older workers. As noted earlier, it is also possible that HSA subsidies have larger 
effects on the small-group insurance market. I examine the additional effect of HSA subsidies on 
small firms by allowing separate HSA effects for different firm sizes in this section. 
      𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑆𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡++ 𝛽4𝐻𝑆𝐴𝑗𝑡𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖)   (6) 
In this case, 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1 if the worker 𝑖 in state 𝑗 in year 𝑡 is employed in a small firm, 
otherwise it is 0. I first define a small firm as one with fewer than 25 employees, and then I 
change the cutoff by setting a firm as a small one if it has fewer than 100 employees to check the 
sensitivity of the results.19 
     Table 5 shows the coefficient estimates for two key variables 𝐻𝑆𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 and 
𝐻𝑆𝐴𝑗𝑡−1𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 in equation (6). The first two columns display results when using cutoff 1 
to define small firms. The last two columns show the results from rerunning regressions with 
cutoff 2. For both cutoffs, HSA tax subsidies have a statistically significant, larger positive effect 
on the group insurance coverage for workers in small firms relative to those in larger firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Different states give different definitions about small firms. Some of the states use the cutoff of 25 employees in 
their regulations and some states use 100 employees. Some states also define a small firm as one with fewer than 50 
workers. But the CPS March Supplement does not use the cutoff “50 employees” in the variable “number of 
employees”. Thus I can only use “25 workers” and “100 workers” to define small firms and do the sample cut.  
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Table 5 
Effect of HSA tax subsidies on group insurance coverage for small firms  
 
                               cutoff 1: small firm <25 
employees      
                   cutoff 2: small firm <100 employees          
                              (1)Probit                    (2)OLS                  (3)Probit      (4)OLS  
HSAs 0.002 -0.002            -0.011          -0.005 
 (0.036) 
[0.0004] 
(0.008)            (0.039) 
           [-0.002] 
         (0.009) 
     
HSAs× 
Small firm 
 
 
Mean coverage 
of small firms 
0.082** 
(0.035) 
[0.024] 
 
0.566 
 
0.041*** 
(0.014) 
 
           0.104*** 
           (0.032) 
           [0.027] 
 
           0.624 
         0.043*** 
         (0.013) 
Notes: Regressions are weighted by supplement weight of CPS. Standard errors are in parentheses and they are 
adjusted for 51 clusters in state. Marginal effects from probit model are reported in square brackets. Regressions are 
based on same covariate specification with equation (5) besides firm size. The last row reports mean level of group 
insurance coverage for small firms using two cutoffs separately. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level.  
 
     In columns (1) and (3), the numbers in square brackets are the average marginal effects of the 
variables. For the marginal effect of the interaction term in the probit model, I use the calculation 
and interpretation suggested by Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) and Karaca-Mandic, Norton and 
Dowd (2012). When using cutoff 1, the probit coefficient on the interaction term is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Its average marginal effect 0.024 implies that the average change in 
the probability of being group-insurance covered for having HSA state subsidies differs between 
small firms and large firms by 2.4 percentage points, with small firms having higher marginal 
effect of HSA subsidies on group health insurance coverage. Since the main marginal effect of 
HSA subsidies is estimated near zero and statistically insignificant, the effect of HSA subsidies 
on small-group health insurance coverage is around 2.4 percentage points. After increasing the 
cutoff number of employees to 100, I get a similarly significant marginal effect of the HSAs 
interaction term at the 1% level: 2.7 percentage points. OLS results in columns (2) and (4) are of 
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slightly larger magnitudes than the estimates from the probit model, but they also indicate larger 
positive effects of HSAs for small firms.  
     To look at the effect of HSA tax subsidies for different firm sizes further, I add one “middle 
firm” category into consideration, and augment estimation equation (6) to:  
     𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑆𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝛽3𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝛽5𝐻𝑆𝐴𝑗𝑡 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 
                +𝛽6𝐻𝑆𝐴𝑗𝑡 × 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖                                                                         (7)                            
where 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1 if the worker 𝑖 in state 𝑗 in year 𝑡 is employed in a small firm (j=1), 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1 if the worker 𝑖 in state 𝑗 in year 𝑡 works in a medium firm. Two sets of 
thresholds are also used to define firm sizes. First, small firms have fewer than 25 employees; 
medium firms have 25-500 workers. And then I change these thresholds to “fewer than 100 
employees” and “between 100 and 1000 employees” to check the results sensitivity.20 
      Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates of the three key variables of equation (7). When 
more than one interaction term is involved in a probit model, there is no clear method for 
assessing their marginal effects, therefore only probit coefficients are reported in columns (1) 
and (3), and the results are interpreted based on OLS estimation reported in column (2) and (4). 
Column (2) shows the OLS results with the initial definition of thresholds; they indicate that 
HSA subsidies are associated with a 3.9 percentage point increase in group coverage for small 
firms, but only 2.1 percentage point increase for medium firms. I again find little effect for large 
                                                          
20 In results not reported here, I have also performed more regressions using two more sets of cutoffs, one is “0-25 
employees”, “25-100 employees” and “more than 100 employees”, another one is “0-100 employees”, “100-500 
employees”, and “more than 500 employees”. The estimates are consistent to the results in table 5. They are all 
statistically significant for the cross terms, and the small firm cross term is of larger magnitude than the medium 
firm cross term. 
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firms. Both of the interaction coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. An F-test is 
also performed to test whether the effect of HSA subsidies for small firms equals the effect for 
medium firms. The test result implies that these two effects are significantly different.21 
     I change my definitions about firm sizes in column (4) of table 6: estimates using the second 
definition of thresholds indicate that HSA tax subsidies increase small-group health insurance 
coverage by almost 4 percentage points, which is also larger than their effect for workers in 
medium firms. An F-test also indicates that the effects are significantly different between small 
firms and medium firms.22 These results suggest that the effect of HSA subsidies decreases 
mostly monotonically with the size of the firm. 
Table 6 
Effect of HSA tax subsidies on group insurance coverage for firms of different sizes  
 
         Thresholds 1                                                Thresholds 2                           
                                  (1)Probit                        (2)OLS                     (3) Probit                    (4)OLS  
HSAs -0.058 -0.014            -0.038             -0.011 
 (0.041) (0.009)            (0.042)             (0.010) 
 
HSAs× 
Medium firm 
 
0.144*** 
(0.035) 
 
0.035*** 
(0.010) 
 
            
           0.075*  
           (0.039)          
            
            0.017*            
            (0.009) 
 
HSAs× 
Small firm    
 
F-statistic  
0.141*** 
(0.041) 
0.053*** 
(0.016) 
 
3.08 
           0.129*** 
           (0.037) 
 
            0.048*** 
            (0.015) 
             
            8.91 
Prob>F 
 
𝜒2 statistic 
Prob>𝜒2 
 
 
0.01 
0.928 
0.085             
 
           2.42 
           0.120 
            0.004 
Notes: Threshold 1: small firm (fewer than 25 employees), medium firm (more than 25, fewer than 500 employees),     
Threshold 2: small firm (fewer than 100 employees), medium firm (more than 100, fewer than 1000 employees) 
Regressions are based on same covariate specification with equation (5) besides firm size. Omitted firm size and cross 
term of HSAs and firm size are large firm and HSAs×large firm.  
*** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
                                                          
21 Based on the 𝜒2 test reported in column (1), they are not distinguishable in the probit. 
22 In column (3), we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of two interaction terms are the same at 10% 
level, but we can reject it at 15% level. 
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5.3 The effect of HSA tax subsidies on workers with different educational levels 
     Previous research suggests that CDHP enrollees have higher educational attainment. But 
highly educated workers may have already gotten coverage from their employers. In that case, 
even though they transfer their traditional plans to HSA/HDHPs because of HSA subsidies, it is 
hard to observe the change in their group insurance coverage overall. On the other hand, workers 
with low educational attainment, such as high school diploma or lower, may not have had group 
health insurance before, and they may gain group coverage because of the establishment of HSA 
subsidies. This section examines the effect of HSA tax subsidies for less educated workers. 
Similar to the analysis about small firms, I allow separate effects of HSA subsidies for workers 
with different levels of education. First I have 
             𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑆𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻𝑆𝐴𝑗𝑡 × 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 
                         +𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖)                                                                                                               (8)      
In equation (8), I code 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑗𝑡=1 if worker 𝑖 in state 𝑗 in year 𝑡 has high school 
diploma or lower; otherwise it is 0. To check whether the effect of HSA tax subsidies varies 
among workers with different educational attainment further, I keep the full set of educational 
levels used in equation (5) and add their interaction terms with HSAs.  
     The coefficients of interest 𝛽1̂ and 𝛽4̂ from estimating equation (8) are presented in panel (A) 
of Table 7. In column (1), the numbers in square brackets are the average marginal effects of the 
probit estimators. The coefficient on the interaction term has a 5% significance level, and it 
translates into a marginal effect of 2.5 percentage points. It implies that HSA subsidies increase 
the group insurance coverage for less educated workers by 2.5 percentage points more than 
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others. Adding the main marginal effect of HSAs, the positive effect of HSA subsidies on less 
educated workers is around 2 percentage points. The OLS estimators in column (2) also indicate 
that the group coverage of workers with a high school diploma or lower are significantly more 
likely to be increased by HSA subsidies than others. 
     Panel (B) reports the estimates for HSAs and its interaction terms with more categories of 
educational attainment. Because the probit coefficients in column (1) without marginal effects 
cannot be directly interpreted, the following interpretation relies on the OLS results in column 
(2). The interaction terms “HSAs × less than high school” and “HSAs × high school” both have 
positive coefficients at the 10% statistical significance level. HSA subsidies are associated with a 
5 percentage point group insurance coverage increase for workers whose education attainment is 
lower than high school, and 2.2 percentage point increase for workers with high school diplomas. 
For other workers, the estimated effect is small and insignificant. An F-test also suggests that the 
effects are significantly different between workers with lower than high school and some college. 
Thus the results in panels (A) and (B) are consistent: HSA subsidies increase workers’ group 
insurance coverage more as their educational attainment becomes lower. While the probit 
coefficients are not as precisely estimated, they are suggestive of the same pattern.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Based on the 𝜒2 test reported in column (1) in Panel (B), we can reject the hypothesis that the effect of HSA 
subsidies for workers with lower than high school is the same as the effect for workers with some college at 5% 
level. 
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Table 7 
 
Effect of HSA tax subsidies on group insurance coverage for workers of different educational attainment  
 
  (1)Probit (2)OLS    
Panel A: single interaction term with low educational attainment    
HSAs  -0.029 -0.009    
  (0.051) (0.011)    
  [-0.006]     
       
HSAs × High school or lower 0.113** 0.044**    
  (0.052) (0.018)    
  [0.025]     
Mean coverage of 
Less-educated workers 
 0.658     
Panel B: a set of interaction terms with different educational attainment    
HSAs  -0.002 -0.004    
  (0.054) (0.011)    
       
HSAs × Lower than high school 0.114 0.054*    
  (0.082) (0.029)    
       
HSAs × High school 0.061 0.026*    
  (0.048) (0.013)    
       
HSAs × Some college -0.005 0.003    
  (0.059) (0.013)    
       
F-statistic   5.03    
Prob>F 
 
𝜒2 statistic 
Prob>𝜒2 
  
 
4.31 
0.038 
0.029 
   
       
Notes: In panel (A), low educational attainment means high school diploma or lower. The last row reports the mean 
level of group insurance coverage of workers with low educational attainment. In panel (B), there are four categories 
of educational levels includes “lower than high school”, “high school diploma”, “some college” and “bachelor degree 
or higher”. The omitted education category is bachelor degree or higher, so as its interaction term with HSAs. 
Marginal effects from probit model are reported in square bracket. 
** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
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5.4 The effect of HSA tax price on group health insurance coverage 
     As discussed above, HSA state income tax subsidies increase employer sponsored health 
insurance coverage at least for some relevant groups of people. But the policy dummy variable 
only reflects the existence of state HSA subsidies, not the magnitude of them. I noted earlier that 
annual marginal federal and state income tax rates decide the level of subsidies jointly; therefore, 
the tax price of HSA contributions is a finer measure of the policy strength as it contains 
information on marginal tax rates as well as HSA subsidy adoption among states. Using HSA 
state tax price instead of the policy dummy, I am able to translate the estimated effect of HSA 
subsidies into a parameterized estimate of the relationship between the tax price of HSAs and 
group insurance coverage.24 While this approach has the advantage that I can measure the effect 
of HSA subsidies more precisely by utilizing income tax rate variation by state and year, it has 
the disadvantage that it imposes strong parametric assumptions. If the functional form of tax 
price in one period or the tax rates that I use in my calculations are not accurate, then the 
treatment-state dummy may be more effective.  
     To calculate the HSA tax price, I impute the top marginal federal rate and state rate by year, 
that are calculated by the TAXSIM model at the National Bureau of Economic Research, into tax 
price formulas (3) and (4). Because variation in tax laws across states and years can be assumed 
as exogenous to an individual’s decision, the maximum income tax rates are nice independent 
variables in a cross-state tax-price regression. Take Minnesota in the year 2006 as an example: 
the marginal federal income tax rate for the top bracket is 32.90%, the marginal state top income 
tax rate is 8.01%, and thus its HSA tax price is 0.5909. As for California, the top marginal 
                                                          
24 Examples for such studies include Royalty (2000), Finkelstein (2002), Gruber and Lettau (2004), Gruber and 
Washington (2005). All of these studies estimate elasticity of employer coverage with respect to the tax price.  
30 
 
federal income tax rate is 32.25% (the top federal rate varies across states because of the 
deductibility of state income tax on the federal tax). Without state income tax exemptions, its 
HSA tax price is then 0.6775 in 2006. There may be potential concerns that unobservable state 
characteristics are correlated with both state maximum income tax rates and group insurance 
coverage. Thus I need to assume that those time-invariant characteristics are captured by the 
fixed effects at the state level. 
     After replacing the policy dummy with the HSA tax price, the regression model (5) becomes  
                                       𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖)                              (9)     
The main results of equation (9) are shown in table 8. From column (1) to column (4) of table 8 
report the estimated coefficients on 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡  in equation (9). The estimated effects of the 
HSA tax price are negative when using the whole sample and the subgroup aged 55-64. They are 
right-signed but not statistically significant, which implies that whole group insurance coverage 
does not appear to be affected by the specific level of HSA tax subsidies.  
Table 8      
Effect of HSA tax price on group insurance coverage  
 
  Whole Sample Age 55-64 
  (1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Probit (4) OLS 
HSAs tax price -0.226 -0.074 -0.591 -0.137 
  (0.355) (0.079) (0.866) (0.194) 
  [-0.048]  [-0.109]  
Note: Regressions are weighted by supplement weight of CPS. Standard errors are in parentheses and they are 
adjusted for 51 clusters in state. Marginal effects from probit model are reported in square brackets. Regression of 
equation (9) is based on same covariate specification with equation (5).  
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     To further investigate the impact of tax price on group insurance coverage for workers of 
small firms and workers with low educational attainment, I also specify the following empirical 
models including interaction term of specific worker type and HSA tax price:  
     𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 
                           +𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖)                                                                                                       (10) 
and 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 
                 +𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖)                                                                                                                (11) 
 
     In table 9, column (1) shows the estimated coefficients on 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 and 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 in equation (10),  and suggests a distinct effect of the HSA subsidy tax 
price on coverage in small firms. The interaction term of HSA tax price and small firm has an 
average marginal effect of -0.185. It shows that when the tax price of HSAs decreases 10 cents, 
small-group insurance coverage is predicted to increase by almost 1.8 percentage points.25 The 
probit estimators 𝛽1̂ and  𝛽4̂ in equation (11) are reported in column (3). The marginal effect of 
the interaction term is statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that there is a larger 
effect of HSA tax price for workers with high school diplomas or lower. When the HSA tax price 
decreases 10 cents, or the HSA tax subsidies increase 10 cents, the group insurance coverage of 
less educated workers is increased by more than 3 percentage points. The OLS results in column 
(2) and (4) have slightly larger magnitudes, but they are still consistent with the conclusion that 
the coverage of these workers is more responsive to the change of HSA tax subsidy level.   
                                                          
25 The tax price of HSAs is between 0 and 1 dollars. 
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Table 9      
Effect of tax price of HSAs on group insurance coverage for workers in different types  
 
  Equation (10): workers in small firms Equation (11): workers with low education 
  (1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Probit (4) OLS 
HSA tax price 0.026               0.056 0.810                  0.220 
  (0.367)               (0.101) (0.533)                  (0.152) 
  [0.006]  [0.172]  
      
HSA tax price × -0.693*              -0.401**   
Small firm (0.430)               (0.181)   
  [-0.185]    
      
HSA tax price ×   -2.258***  -0.782** 
Low education   (0.830) (0.325) 
    [-0.494]  
Note: Regressions are weighted by supplement weight of CPS. Standard errors are in parentheses and they are 
adjusted for 51 clusters in state. Marginal effects from probit model are reported in square brackets. Regression of 
equation (10) is based on same covariate specification with equation (6). Equation (11) uses same covariate 
specification with equation (8). Low education means high school or lower. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
6. Robustness Checks 
6.1 Testing identification assumption 
     The interpretation of the preceding results is based on the identifying assumption mentioned 
in the methodology discussion: in the absence of HSA state income tax subsidies, group 
coverage in HSA states and non-HSA states would have followed similar trends between 2004 
and 2012. This section seeks to check this assumption. As there is revenue loss for HSA state 
income tax exemptions, the state financial situation has a significant impact on HSA tax law 
change. Moreover, state government ideology is also involved in the decision of subsidy 
adoption. Even though the provision of state HSA subsidies is not directly decided by group 
insurance coverage, these political economy factors may simultaneously influence the law 
passing and insurance coverage. States fixed effects can control for the average coverage 
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difference, but it is still necessary to address the adequacy of the control states for providing a 
counterfactual trend.  
     With additional data going back to the March 1999 CPS supplement, I first check the pre-
trends in group insurance coverage and the coverage gap between different type workers in HSA 
states and non-HSA states by years. All of the plotted pre-trend checks are available in the 
Appendix. For both the group coverage and coverage gap, they suggest similar patterns prior to 
the enactment year for states with and without HSAs. Secondly, I exploit the variation in the 
timing of HSA regulations across states to plot the trends in average group coverage of HSA-
states within five years of policy adoptions in Fig. 2. The four panels show the coverage trends 
separately for the whole sample, older workers, small firms, and less-educated workers. There is 
no obvious graphical evidence in the pattern of plotted coverage relative to the timing of HSA 
enactment. The slight decline in group coverage is associated with the enactment timing from 
five years before to five years after.26 This may just follow the decreased trend in coverage of the 
broader US group insurance market.  
                                                          
26 The average coverage of 5 years before HSAs is much higher than other timing because during my event study 
period, this average comes from only two states: Maine and Pennsylvania that adopted HSAs in 2006. They just 
have much higher average coverage than other states.  
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Fig. 2. Trends in group insurance coverage before/after enactment 
     Because the small treatment effect of HSA subsidies cannot be shown strongly with graphical 
evidence alone, these plotted graphs of average coverage are also not sufficient to fully rule out 
the concern about different pre-trends. I provide full parametric event studies to further address 
the pre-existing trends that are potentially confounding the results. This is done by running the 
probability of being covered by group health insurance on dummy variables equal to one when 
the workers of state-year is one, two, three, four and five years before and after the enactment of 
HSA state subsidies.27 I omit the “time zero year” so that each coefficient is estimated relative to 
                                                          
27 The event study analysis only uses linear regressions. Because previous findings all suggest that non-linear and 
linear regressions have similar results, the trends estimated by linear and non-linear probit model should be 
consistent.  
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the year immediately preceding the HSA subsidies. The controls include a full set of 
demographic characteristics as well as state and year fixed effects. Estimates for periods prior to 
HSA subsidies enactment dates provide a sense of the importance of pre-existing trends that are 
correlated with changes in coverage, while the estimates for years after the effective year 
measure the dynamic effect of HSA subsidies on group insurance coverage.  
 
 Fig. 3. Impact of HSA subsidies on group insurance coverage before/after enactment 
     Fig. 3 presents the point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals graphically, and the 
four panels also present four ways to limit the sample separately. The year relative to the 
enactment year is captured on x-axis, and the y-axis presents the percentage change of group 
coverage related to the enactment year. All of the estimates for prior years are very small in 
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magnitude and statistically insignificant.28 They show that the group coverage in years prior to 
the enactment of HSA subsidies is not significantly different from the group coverage in the 
enactment year. In the year after HSAs is enacted, the group coverage begins to increase relative 
to the year before in all of the panels. This suggests that coefficients on HSA subsidies are not 
correlated with a pre-existing trend in group coverage. This parametric event study provides 
further support to previous findings that HSA subsidies increase group insurance coverage at 
least for specific types of workers.  
6.2 Sensitivity analysis: variation in benefit design by states 
     My main empirical framework allows for different coverage across different states and years, 
and controls for any observable factors that might change the relative group insurance coverage. 
But there are potential concerns that other changes (such as group insurance plan design at the 
state level), that are correlated with the adoption of HSA subsidies could bias these estimates. 
Thus I explore below the sensitivity of my findings to incorporating variation of premium and 
employees’ contribution into analysis by using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance 
Component (MEPS-IC) 2004-2012.29 It contains the information on premium by state and year: 
the average total single premium per enrolled employee, percent of total premiums contributed 
by employees enrolled in single coverage, average total family premium per enrolled employee, 
and percent of total premiums contributed by employees enrolled in family coverage.    
                                                          
28 The coefficients of event study are reported in the Appendix. 
29 2007 data for the Insurance Component was not collected because of the preparation for improvements in the data 
collection process. 
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Fig. 4. States that adopt HSAs in different years  
 
Fig. 5. Average premiums and premium share of employees (2004) 
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     I first look at whether the policy enactment is relative to the premium level or contribution 
share of employees. Fig. 4 presents a map of the variation of state HSAs policy from 2003 to 
2004, the first two years of my research period when almost half of the states provide their 
subsidies for HSAs. The states in darkest color had earliest HSA subsidies such as Arizona, 
Montana and Indiana. Some states in lighter color followed federal exemption one year later in 
2004 and others are the states that had not accepted HSAs before 2005. Fig. 5 shows maps of the 
average premiums and the percent of premiums contributed by employees in each state of 2004. 
Panel A and Panel B reflect individual plans and the other two panels reflect family plans. The 
darkest states had highest premium or contribution percent and the lightest ones had lowest 
average level. Based on Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, there is no evidence that the states with earlier HSAs 
had systematically higher or lower premium and employees’ share. The comparison of these 
maps can relieve the concern about correlative HSAs adoption with specific group health plan 
design.  
     Secondly, adding these state-year level premiums and contribution shares as controls, I re-
estimate all previous equations to check the sensitivity of results further. I drop observations 
from 2007 because the premium data is unavailable, and the results are all consistent with my 
previous findings. They show that the effect of HSAs on group insurance coverage does not 
change much after supplementing state benefit design into the analysis. The estimation results 
are reported in Appendix Table A1.  
7. Conclusion 
     This study provides new evidence of the effect of HSA state income tax subsidies on group 
health insurance coverage. My analysis presents several specifications of the effect of HSA 
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subsidies with well-supported identification assumption. The 2003 federal law and the following 
state legislation on HSAs provide useful state-by-year policy variation. In additional, the 
different federal and state marginal income tax rates also make HSA tax subsidies different 
across states and times. With these sources of variation, I find that HSA state income subsidies 
improve group insurance coverage for certain important subgroups of the population.  
     Even though the positive effect for whole sample is limited, having such subsidies results in a 
2 percentage point increase in insurance coverage through the workplace for employees who are 
between the ages of 55 and 64. I also find that employees in small firms or employees with low 
educational attainment are more responsive to state HSA subsidies. When these types of workers 
live in a state that provides HSA income subsidies, there is a 2-3 percentage point increase in 
their probability of being covered by group insurance. Furthermore, a ten cent decrease in the tax 
price of HSA contributions increases their group insurance coverage by about 2-3 percentage 
points. Compared to other policies, the overall effect of HSA state tax exemptions can be 
considered a substantial one. Using the small-group insurance market as an example, Simon 
(2005) finds that state small-group health insurance reforms decrease group insurance coverage 
for workers in small firms by almost two percentage points.30 My findings suggest that the effect 
of HSAs have a similarly-sized effect to that of state small-group health insurance reform on the 
small-group insurance market.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
     Along with the direct evidence about the impact of HSA subsidies on coverage, my results 
can also provide policy implications for cutting health care cost and implementing PPACA. 
HDHPs had already moderated cost increases before health care reform under PPACA. 
                                                          
30 State legislators took steps to restrict rating and redlining in the small-group health insurance market. Small-group 
reforms include rating restrictions, “bare bones” plan laws and pre-existing conditions exclusion laws. 
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According to a large assessment by RAND Corporation, people who shifted to HDHPs dropped 
an average of 14 percent of health spending when compared to people with traditional plans. 
Therefore, HSA subsidies that increase the enrollment in HDHPs can promote this health 
spending cut through the consumer-driven design of the plans. Furthermore, the PPACA-
qualified HSA/HDHPs may make the mandatory coverage more achievable for the employers 
who are facing steeply increasing health care costs in the future. Finally, there is a concern that 
people in HDHPs cut some necessary care such as preventive care to save medical expense. But 
after putting HSA/HDHPs in a PPACA context, preventive care may not be dropped because 
health plan deductibles must be waived from preventive treatments under PPACA.  
     Some other effects of HSAs on health care market are still unknown. Several related 
questions remain unanswered in this paper due to data limitations. First, it would be interesting 
to know how much HSA/HDHPs reduce unnecessary health care spending caused by the moral 
hazard of traditional plans. And along with preventive care, is there any other necessary care that 
is cut by taking HDHPs? The answers may depend on different types of health care, because 
although HSA/HDHPs have higher deductibles, they cover some expenses which are not covered 
by traditional plans, such as eye care and dental care. It would also be interesting to study 
whether workers change their traditional health plans into HSA/HDHP plans and what is the 
magnitude of this change. Finally, what kind of people gains from enrolling HSA/HDHPs? The 
optimal design of HSAs remains an area of priority for future research. 
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Appendix A. 
 
 
 
Fig. A1. Trends in average group insurance coverage. Notes: These graphs show the comparisons of the pre-trends in 
group coverage between HSA states and non-HSA states. Take panel A as an example, the states that adopted HSA 
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state income tax subsidies in 2003 are HSA states and others are non-HSA states. The graph shows average group 
health insurance coverage trends of these two kinds of states. It indicates that prior to 2003, the trends of HSA states 
2003 and non-HSA state 2003 are roughly similar. In 2004, some states began to provide income tax exemptions for 
HSAs thus their statuses changed from non-HSA states to HSA states. Panel B indicates similar trends between the 
states that adopted HSA subsidies in 2004 and the control states without HSA subsidies prior to 2004. As shown in 
other panels, the plotted pre-trends of group coverage using the year 2005, 2006 and 2011 to separate HSAs and non-
HSA states also found no statistically significant trend differences in the period leading up to enactment year.31  
 
 
                                                          
31 Most of the policy variation occurs in 2003-2005, thus only the graphs about these years are reported. The pre-
trend checks of coverage for other years as well as coverage gap between low and high educational workers are 
available in Appendix, they also support the first identification assumption. 
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Fig. A2. Trends in small-firm vs. large firm gap in group coverage. Notes: These graphs show the comparisons of the 
pre-trends in the coverage gap between large and small firms in HSA states and non-HSA states. Panel A suggests 
similar patterns of coverage gap between small firms and large firms before HSA enactment in 2003,32 which suggests 
that differences in trends after 2003 are due to the establishment of HSAs, rather than underlying differences between 
firm sizes. The patterns in the coverage gap between different worker types are also compared in other panels. They 
show that, for the small-firm and large-firm gap in coverage rates, HSA states and non-HSA states follow similar 
trends before enactment year.  
 
 
                                                          
32 Small-firm: less than 100 employees.  
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Fig. A3. Trends in low-education vs. high-education gap in group coverage. Notes: These graphs show the 
comparisons of the pre-trends in the coverage gap between high-educational workers and low-educational workers in 
HSA states and non-HSA states. 
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Fig. A4. Trends in group coverage/coverage gap of states that adopt HSAs in 2003, 2004, and 2005. Notes: Panel A 
shows the comparisons of the pre-trends in group insurance coverage of states that adopt HSAs earlier and later. There 
is no obvious difference in the pattern of plotted coverage related to the year of enactment. Panel B depicts the pre-
trend in the small-firm vs. large-firm group insurance coverage gap for states that adopt HSA state income subsidies 
in different years. It supports that state adoption is not preceded by a difference in the pattern between small and large-
firm coverage. 
Table A1.  
Effect of HSAs on group coverage including premium analysis  
   
 Whole sample                                Age 55-64 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS 
HSAs 0.008 -0.005 -0.009 0.028** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
     
HSAs ×  0.042***   
Small firms  (0.013)   
     
HSAs ×   0.043**  
Low education   (0.019)  
     
Single average premium Y Y Y Y 
Single premium share Y Y Y Y 
Family average premium Y Y Y Y 
Family premium share Y Y Y Y 
Note: Regressions are weighted by supplement weight of CPS. Standard errors are in parentheses and they are 
clustered at state level. Regressions are based on same covariate specification with equations in main context. Besides 
I add four more controls about state-year average premium and employee share into estimations. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level.  
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Table A2     
Event Study Analysis 2001-2008    
 Whole sample 55-64 years old Small firms  Low-education 
5 years before -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.018) (0.005) (0.008) 
4 years before -0.004 -0.009 -0.010 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
3 years before -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
2 years before -0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
1 years before -0.004 0.000 -0.010* 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
1 year after 0.007* 0.006 0.012** 0.010 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
2 year after 0.009** 0.012 0.013* 0.009 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
3 year after 0.010** 0.014 0.018** 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
4 year after 0.005 -0.001 0.016* 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
5 year after 0.003 0.016 0.005 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
Note: Regressions are weighted by supplement weight of CPS. Standard errors are in parentheses and they are   
clustered at state level.  
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
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1. Introduction 
     Group health insurance is the leading source of health coverage in the American market,33 the 
related legislation thus has been politically salient for decades. By regulating the issuance, 
content, and price of group health plans, the legislation is expected to reduce the uninsured 
population, or to further ensure the covered people can access appropriate level of health care. 
One major type of state regulation that has experienced a tremendous growth in past twenty 
years is mandated health insurance benefits. It requires group insurance coverage to include 
certain type of medical procedure or treatment, such as maternity care, diabetes supplies, cancer 
screening, mental illness treatment or drug and alcohol abuse treatment. These mandates may 
increase the well-being of workers who value such medical services, since they can access to 
more comprehensive health insurance protection.34 However, inclusion of extra medical services 
to the existing health insurance package may increase the provision costs of group health 
insurance for employers, and then change one attribute of an employment contract. The purpose 
of this paper is to examine several labor market consequences of one typical mandated-benefit: 
mental health parity laws that prohibit insurers from discriminating between coverage for mental 
and physical health care. 
     Traditionally, the benefits for mental health have had more restrictions than physical health in 
group health plans (American Psychological Association, 2010). To reinvent the safety net for 
mental illness and substance abuse, many states have passed their own mental health parity laws 
that apply to fully insured group health plans to require equal coverage for mental and physical 
                                                          
33 Two-thirds of the nonelderly population is covered by group health insurance plans related to the workplaces of 
their own or their family members; more than half of workers take health insurance from their own employers 
(Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust, 2012). 
34 According to Summers (1989), mandated benefits are similar with public programs financed through benefit 
taxes, and they can save some inefficiencies of public good provisions.  
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illness.35 The federal government also took steps to promote more comprehensive coverage for 
mental health in employer-sponsored plans as part of the Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA), 
which took effective in 1998, and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act 
(MHPAEA), starting in 2010. MHPAEA continues and expands MHPA and is still effective in 
the context of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Employer-sponsored 
plans referred in both of the federal parity laws include fully insured plans as well as self-insured 
arrangements.36 
     For employers, compliance to parity laws drives up the costs of providing group health 
insurance coverage substantially, because insurers are required to pay for mental health care that 
funded by consumers previously. The first factor associated with the cost of parity laws is the 
extent of differential coverage before their implementation. Employer Health Benefits Survey of 
1991 (Health Insurance Association of America) presents that more than 80 percent of group 
health insurance covered workers have mental health benefits, but nearly 70 percent of the group 
plans featuring with those benefits impose stricter limitations on them than physical care, 
including lower annual or lifetime dollar limits, less inpatient and outpatient services, office 
visits, emergency care and prescription drugs, or higher deductibles, copayments and 
coinsurance (United States General Accounting Office, 2000 and Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust, 2002).37 That means most of the group 
health plans need to scrutinize their plan designs to comply with mental health parity laws. 
                                                          
35 Fully insured plans refer to the plans provided by an insurance company to cover the employees and dependents 
and signed contracts by employers. 
36 Self-insured plans are the health or disability benefits to employees provided by employers with its own funds. 
37 Only the 2002 survey asked a special series of questions about mental health benefits for each plan. 
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     The second determinant of mental parity cost is the premium increased by adding equal 
mental health benefits to a policy or increasing the generosity of the existing benefits in a 
package. Many of the commonly mandated benefits have significantly raised the price of 
individual and family health coverage (The Bureau of Labor Statistics Employee Benefits 
Survey, 1981-1984), and mental health mandates is one of the highest-cost mandates (Gruber, 
1994). According to the cost assessment of each state mandate provided by the Council of 
Affordable Health Insurance in 2009,38 mental health parity is estimated to increase the average 
premium by 5-10% and even the minimum mental health benefits mandates and 
alcoholism/substance abuse mandate can increase the premium by 1-3%.39 
     As the costs of providing group health benefits increase, several labor market outcomes may 
register adjustments because group health insurance is an important component of workers’ 
compensation package. First of all, the raising group insurance costs may be offset by lower 
wages if the total compensation remains the same.40 Secondly, when there are some constraints 
that limit the ability of lowering wages, employers may want to substitute part-time workers who 
are usually exempted from health coverage provision for full-time workers.41 And they could 
also increase working time per worker instead of adding additional full-time workers when 
                                                          
38 CAHI’s independent Actuarial Working Group on State Mandated Benefits analyzed company data and their 
experience to provide cost-range estimates (less than 1%, 1-3%, 3-5% and 5-10%) if the mandate were added to a 
policy that did not include the coverage. These estimates are based on real health insurance policies instead of theory 
or modeling. 
39 It is possible that employers may decrease the generosity of other benefits which are not mandated; increase the 
premium share of employees, or other non-health fringe benefits to keep the total employment costs unchanged. But 
no evidence shows that there is a decrease in neither generosity nor non-health fringe benefits because of the parity 
laws (Anand, 2011). Although Gruber and McKnight (2003) indicates that part of the increased employee health 
insurance premium contribution is because the rising costs, but not all of the increased costs can be transferred to 
employees’ contribution.  
40 Compensation package usually includes direct benefits (such as wages and bonus) and indirect benefits (such as 
insurance and pensions). 
41 According to Internal Revenue Service nondiscrimination rules require if group health insurance is offered, it 
should be offered to all full-time workers.  
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considering health benefits provision as a quasi-fixed cost of employment. At last, if the 
provision of group health insurance is voluntary, employers may choose to drop the health plan 
offering when the costs are too high, then the average group health coverage may be deceased. 
        Except for the labor demand side, the enactment of mental health parity laws may also 
impact the labor supply side in both extensive and intensive margins. The magnitude of the labor 
supply response depends on how much does the employee value the benefits. If the mental 
benefits are fully valued, individuals may increase the extensive labor supply to get workplace 
coverage and take advantage of the new benefits; there should be no change in employment in 
this case. Otherwise, the new equilibrium employment will be lower. As for the intensive 
margin, parity laws may increase the working hours/weeks. Because part-time or seasonal 
workers would like to increase their working time to be qualified for the group coverage. Also, if 
the expansion of mental health care access can improve the mental health outcomes of workers, 
there are theoretical and empirical reasons for expecting better mental health increases 
productivity. 
     The theoretical prediction about the change direction of working time after mental health 
mandates is ambiguous, and consistent empirical evidence on that is still lacking.42 Thus my 
paper focuses on finding new empirical evidence on the effect of parity laws on working time. 
To identify it, I first merge state by year policy implementation variation to the individuals in the 
Current Population Survey March supplements from 1992 to 2010. My results suggest that, for 
                                                          
42 Even though wages are predicted to be lower in the theory, the existing studies about the effect of state mental 
health mandates do not find significant negative effect on wages. Thus I tried to look at the effect of state mental 
health parity laws on hourly wages with more comprehensive policy data in longer time period, and the result is still 
insignificant. Then my “reserve experimental” of 2010 federal parity law also suggests small and insignificant effect 
on wages. The results are shown in Appendix Table A2. 
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25-64-year-old workers in the private sector, there is a 1.4% increase in weeks worked per year 
in the parity states during this research period. For workers of 35-44 years old, state mental 
health parity laws increase their probability of working part-time by 1.8 percentage points, and 
their average hours worked per week are decreased by 1.7% by this employment composition 
change. Since self-insured firms are exempted from state mandated regulations, I also estimate 
the effect of state parity laws on small firms which are more likely to be fully insured (non-self-
insured). The results indicate that state parity laws increase the weeks worked approximately 1% 
more for workers in small firms compared to others. 
     I then examine the effects of two federal parity laws to see whether they confirm my previous 
findings. The enactments of MHPA (effective in 1998) and MHPAEA (effective in 2010) can be 
both treated as “reverse experiments” by making states having their own parity laws useful as a 
set of controls. The before-and-after comparisons of experimental states (that had not  adopted 
state parity laws before the effective year of federal laws) and non-experimental states (that had 
already adopted state parity laws before the effective year of federal laws) indicate that MHPA 
has little effect on working time.43 While MHPAEA, a stronger federal law than MHPA, 
increases weeks worked by 1.7%. The findings on these state/federal parity laws pass a pre-trend 
check, and are robust to the inclusion of state, year, and region-by-year effects as well as state-
specific trends. 
     The measurements of working time (hours and weeks worked) used in my empirical analysis 
can be considered as equilibrium outcomes which reflect the information from the demand side 
of employer combined with the supply side of employee. One of the caveats in this paper is that I 
                                                          
43 There are two federal laws effective in different years, so the research periods of two “reverse experiments” 
depends on the actual enactment years.  
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cannot separate them from each other empirically. Also for the most affected population, 
workers with mental illness or high risk of getting sick, they cannot be analyzed separately since 
they are not direct-demographically identifiable group,44 thus the increased working week is an 
average estimate for the general population regardless of their mental health status or mental 
illness risks. According to previous literature as well as some suggestive empirical evidences 
discussed in the following sections, I would like to argue my findings as an “efficiency costs” 
rather than “equity benefits” story. The positive effect on working weeks is mainly driven by an 
increase in health insurance costs or an incentive for increasing extensive margin of labor supply, 
but not a better mental health outcome. 
     The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I first introduce the conceptual 
framework for the economics about group health insurance mandates, followed by an 
introduction to mental health parity and the legislative variation at both the state and the federal 
level. After a review of previous literature in section 3, I use section 4 to illustrate the empirical 
work for the effect of state mental health parity laws. It includes data, methodology and results as 
well. In section 5, I provide the “reverse experiments” of two federal parity laws following 
similar steps to section 4. Section 6 checks the identification assumptions and sensitivity of the 
results. Section 7 provides a brief discussion of the mechanisms about the effect of parity laws 
on working time. And section 8 concludes. 
 
 
                                                          
44 If a mandate expands benefits form a demographically identifiable group within a workplace, it is called “group-
specific mandate” such as mandated maternity benefits mentioned in Gruber (1994). 
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2. Background 
2.1  Conceptual framework about group insurance mandates and the labor market 
     In this section, I discuss the conceptual framework that motivates my empirical analysis. 
After reviewing the existing theoretical literature on labor market consequences of mandated 
benefit program, my main take-away is that enacting a health insurance mandate rises the costs 
of providing group health insurance, then the labor demand and labor supply may both shift and 
several aspects of the labor market, such as employment, wages, working time and group 
insurance coverage may be changed based on the new equilibrium. 
     Summers (1989) considers the economics of mandated benefit proposals. His supply and 
demand model shows that imposing a mandated benefit requires employers to pay more for 
employees. If workers value the benefit, the labor supply increases while labor demand 
decreases. A new equilibrium level of employment and wages is reached with lower wages and 
an ambiguous change in employment. Gruber and Krueger (1991) provide a more formal model 
and derive that the effect of mandated benefits on the labor market depends on the elasticities of 
labor demand and supply, the costs of the benefits, and how much employees value the benefits.  
     Applying the analysis above to health insurance, Summers suggests that mandating group 
health insurance should not affect the decisions about workers’ hours worked. Because health 
insurance is a fixed cost, workers do not get more group insurance with more hours worked. But 
Feldman (1993) argues that the income effect created by mandated lump-sum benefits is too 
large to be assumed away. Health benefits increase and other consumption goods decrease after 
imposing the mandates. Thus if labor supply is treated as divisible hours, mandated health 
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benefits should cause employees to increase their working hours in order to obtain more 
consumption goods and keep the same level of utility. 
     Feldman provides the mechanism of increasing hours worked from employees’ margins. On 
the other hand, Culter and Madrian (1998) emphasize the mechanism that employers also have 
incentive to ask more hours from fewer workers when the fixed costs of employment increase. 
Their framework is introduced briefly as follows. Let 𝑓(𝐻 ∙ 𝑁) be the firm’s production function 
and 𝐶 = 𝑁 ∙ 𝑀(𝐻, 𝑃) be the cost of hiring workers. The variable 𝐻 represents the hours, 𝑁 
represents the number of employees. And 𝑀(𝐻, 𝑃) is a function of total compensation which 
depends on the hours 𝐻 and the price of benefit 𝑃. The firm chooses 𝑁 and 𝐻 to maximize 
profits: 
                                                   max
𝐻,𝑁
𝜋 = 𝑓(𝐻 ∙ 𝑁) − 𝑁 ∙ 𝑀(𝐻, 𝑃)                                             (1) 
     This profit function makes the assumptions that workers and hours are perfect substitutes, and 
employers offer employees a wage/hours bundles instead of an hourly wage with flexible hours. 
After totally differentiating the two first-order conditions of equation (1) and rearranging terms, 
they solve for 𝑑𝐻/𝑑𝑃: 
                                                    
𝑑𝐻
𝑑𝑃
=
𝑀𝑃
𝐻
−𝑀𝑃𝐻
𝑀𝐻𝐻
                                             (2) 
And 𝑑𝑁/𝑑𝑃: 
                                                  
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝑃
= −
𝑁
𝐻
𝑑𝐻
𝑑𝑃
+
𝑀𝑃
𝐻2𝑓′′
                                                (3) 
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     Equation (2) implies that the effect of increasing benefit price depends on the average cost of 
an additional hour relative to the marginal cost of an additional hour. From equation (3), 
increasing health insurance costs changes both hours worked and number of workers employed. 
And if the effect on hour worked is positive, the effect on employment should be negative, and 
vice versa. To conclude: all the relevant models about the effect of benefit costs on labor market 
outcomes have implications for the changes of wages, working time or employment.  
2.2 Introduction of mental health parity laws 
     Approximately 30% of population in the US is estimated to experience some level of 
diagnosable mental illness or substance use disorder, and the majority of them do not get 
appropriate treatment. (Kessler et al., 1994). One reason is that the treatment of mental illness 
and substance abuse is not the same with other physical illnesses in terms of private health 
insurance policy in US traditionally. After mental health has been integrates into the main stream 
of health care system since 1950s, it has been under the spotlight in the state and federal 
legislative sessions for decades. Efforts to improve mental health benefits in group health 
insurance market date back to the 1970s, when a few state legislatures began to establish 
mandatory minimum benefit levels for substance use disorder. Until the late 1980s, the majority 
of legislative activities only required insurers to provide a certain level of coverage for mental 
health conditions, and they were more related to substance use disorder, especially alcoholism.  
     To further minimize the disparities between coverage of physical health and mental health, 
some states began to enact mental health parity (which requires equal coverage for physical and 
mental illness) in the early 1990s for fully insured firms. To be more specific, state parity laws 
typically prohibit insurance companies from offering insurance plans that place greater financial 
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requirements or treatment limitations for mental illness than for physical illness.45 By 2010, 
twenty-eight states have had mental health parity laws, although these laws have variation with 
respect to the scope and application. Some states, such as Oregon and Vermont, have more 
comprehensive parity laws, they require equal coverage for mental illness including all of the 
broad-based mental health disorders,46 and they also apply to all significant policy groups. While 
some states, such as California and Massachusetts, impose parity laws that limit equal coverage 
for specific mental health conditions or for certain groups.47  
     As for the other states that have not adopted mental health parity, they can be broadly divided 
into three categories: mandated offering, minimum benefit mandated, and no mental health 
mandates. Mandate offering states require equal coverage of mental and physical illness 
condition on the mental health coverage is offered by the insurers, or require plan to offer an 
option of equal mental health coverage. Minimum benefit mandated states only mandate 
minimum level of mental health coverage that is not required to be equal to other medical 
conditions. And no mental health mandates at all means the states do not have any regulations 
about mental health coverage.48 During 1992-2010, every state besides Wyoming have either 
parity laws or some types of mental health mandates. 
                                                          
45 Financial requirements include deductibles, copayments, coinsurance rates, and out-of-pocket limitations. 
Treatment limitations include numbers of covered hospital days and outpatient office visits. 
46 A broad-based mental health disorders refers to a relatively broad range of mental disorders including almost any 
psychiatric, neurological, substance abuse, developmental, or intellectual disorder. 
47 Specific mental health conditions usually mean major mental illness, typically defined in statute as schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective, disorder, psychotic disorders, bipolar disorder, major depression, panic disorders, and obsessive 
compulsive disorder. Certain groups refer to large firms or state employees.  
48 In the following empirical analysis, I use a single dummy to identify state parity law under generalized definition. 
If the state has any parity, no matter how its strength is, the dummy equals 1, if 0 otherwise even though it has 
mandate offering or minimum benefit. I do not consider the different effects of different types of parity laws because 
the boundaries for these parity laws are not well-defined and the rising costs of them are similar. 
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     Fig. 1 shows the states that enacted mental health parity laws in four different years. It 
indicates the development of state legislation of parity laws during the research period. The data 
about the regulatory regime comes from several sources including Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Service Administration (SAMHSA) and Center for Mental Health Service (CMHS) from 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Service, National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), 
National Conference of State Legislatures, Blue Cross Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) and 
specific state laws and statues.49  
 
Fig. 1. States Mental Health Parity Laws 
                                                          
49 All of the data sources are reliable about the year of state mandates, but inconsistences still exist between them. 
To improve the quality of policy enactment year, I use specific state laws and statues to double check if other data 
sources cannot provide consistent effective year. They are all reported in Appendix.  
63 
 
     In addition to the growing popularity of mental health parity laws at the state level, the federal 
government also succeeded in pressing for mental benefit parity nationwide in 1996. The Mental 
Health Parity Act (MHPA, effective in January, 1998) requires group insurance plans to apply 
the same lifetime and annual dollar limits to mental health coverage as those applied to physical 
health coverage. Group health insurance plans under the federal parity context include the plans 
provided by private and public sectors with more than 50 employees and the plans sold by health 
insurers to employers with more than 50 employees. Comparing the extent and scope of MHPA 
to state parity legislation, the former does not go well beyond the state full or nearly full parity 
because the statute applies only if mental health benefits are offered in an insurance plan. From 
this point of view, MHPA could be generally considered as a “mandate offering” law, or even a 
weaker one because it only requires equal dollar limits. However, state parity laws exempt self-
insured employer-sponsored plans because of Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA). This federal preemption cuts the potential affected workers with coverage by half. 
MHPA fills this regulatory gap and thus reaches more employees than parity at the state level.  
     With the sunset provision in MHPA in 2008, a new federal law called Mental Health Parity 
Act and Addiction Equity (MHPAEA, effective in July, 2010) took place in mandating non-
discriminatory coverage for mental and physical health conditions. Except for continuing the 
parity rules required by MHPA, MHPAEA expands the scope of MHPA by including substance 
use disorders. It also expands the MHPA requirement of parity on the lifetime and annual dollar 
limits by adding additional protections relating to financial requirements, treatment limitations, 
and out-of-network benefits. To be more specific, the financial requirements (such as 
deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket limitations) imposed by group plans to 
Mental Health/Substance Use Disorder (MH/SUD) benefits cannot be more restrictive than those 
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applicable to other medical benefits. Similar for treatment limitations, more restrictions on 
frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, and scope or duration of treatment 
are not allowed to apply to the MH/SUD than physical health. What is more, if a plan or insurer 
offers medical benefits on an out-of-network basis, it should offer the MH/SUD benefits on an 
out-of-network basis too.  
3. Literature Review 
     As discusses earlier, the labor demand and labor supply could both be affected by the rising 
group insurance costs and the expansion of health care access after the implementation of 
mandates. Previous studies have focus primarily on the effect of mandated health benefits 
enactment on related labor market consequences such as employment, wages, hours and weeks 
worked and labor input composition, or some health insurance outcomes such as group coverage 
and generosity of non-wage compensation.  
     Because mandated benefits are widely believed to increase the health insurance costs, I start 
the discussion from a group of literature that look at the effect of rising health insurance costs on 
labor market outcomes directly. The evidence that the cost increases are offset by lower wages 
has already been provided by previous studies (Gruber and Krueger, 1991; Sheiner, 1999; 
Baicker and Chandra, 2006; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012). But the empirical findings about the 
change in work hours are mixed. Culter and Madrian (1998) show that rising health costs 
increases hours worked of those with health insurance by up to 3%. In contrast, Baicker and 
Chandra (2006) estimate that a 10% increase in health insurance premiums reduces hours 
worked by 2.4%, because the likelihood of a worker being part-time is increased by 1.9 
percentage points.  
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     By using the variation of state and federal level legislation about group maternity benefits, 
Gruber (1994) considers the labor-market effects of mandated maternity benefits and finds 
substantial shifting of the costs to the wages and little effect on total labor input of targeted 
group. And he also investigates the presence of state regulations which mandate that group 
health insurance plans must include certain benefits have little effect on the rate of insurance 
coverage in another project (1994). Kaestner and Simon (2002) find that state-mandated health 
insurance benefits have no statistically significant effect on wages, weeks of work and group 
insurance coverage, but increase weekly work hours during 1989-1998. Cseh (2008) and Lang 
(2013) study the effect of state mental health parity law enactment during a time period but find 
no evidence that these mandates affect labor market outcomes significantly. The most recently 
study about study of the labor market effects of parity laws is provided by Anderson (2015). 
Using the state by year legislative variation between 1997 and 2001, he suggests that parity 
mandates improve the labor market outcomes of workers with mental distress.  
     Besides, there are some case studies for states with special mandated regulations. Hawaii has 
the most durable employer health insurance mandates in United States: Hawaii’s Prepaid Health 
Care. Hawaii’s law does not lower the wages and the employment possibilities, but increases the 
reliance on part-time workers who are exempted from the law (Thurston, 1997; Buchmueller et 
al. 2011). Massachusetts also has its own “mandated-based” health reforms. Kolstad and 
Kowalski (2012) show that the jobs with employer sponsored health insurance pay lower wages 
because the newly insured value group coverage.  
     The literature about mental health mandates are not limited to the labor market effect, their 
impacts on mental health care service utilization and mental health have also been broadly 
studied. According to most of literature about early parity laws, there is no statistically 
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significant evidence to show that state parity improves the access to mental health care (Sturm 
and Pacula, 1999; Pacula and Sturm, 2000; Bao and Sturm, 2004). Maybe it is difficult to 
identify the causal effect of mental health parity on those access or health outcomes because the 
law adoption is correlated with them. To solve that, Klick and Markowitz (2006) examine the 
impact of mental health insurance mandates on suicide rates at state level with two-stage least 
square estimators, but mental health mandates are still not effective in reducing suicide. As for 
more recent parity laws, an increase in mental health utilization associated with these mandates 
are found for small firms (Busch and Barry, 2008). And Lang (2013) presents a reduction in 
suicide rate also.  
     However, the evidences on the impact of state mental health parity on the labor market, 
especially working time and part-time worker employment are still lacking. My study adds to the 
previous literature in two ways. First, I provide a comprehensive empirical analysis about the 
effect of state mental health parity laws on working hours/weeks during a long time period that 
covers all the development of all state parity legislations. And I also show the variation in effects 
among different age groups, genders and firm sizes. Second, I provide new evidence on the 
effects of two federal mental health parity laws (MHPA and MHPAEA) on working time by a 
“reverse experiments”. The analysis about federal mandates can further confirm my earlier 
findings, and also provide suggestive evidence for the mechanisms of the effect on working time. 
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4. The Effect of State Mental Health Parity Laws 
4.1 Data and methodology 
     The first goal of my empirical work is to identify the effect of mental health parity laws, and 
this analysis is based primarily on repeated cross-sectional data from 1992 to 2010 Current 
Population Survey’s March Supplement (IPUMS-CPS, University of Minnesota). I restrict the 
sample to individuals aged 25-64 who were employed in the past year in the private sector, and 
were not self-employed. Limiting to prime-age employees eliminates changes in coverage due to 
school enrollment, parents’ coverage or retirement. Besides abundant individual characteristics 
(such as age, gender, race, marital status, number of children, union status, education, firm sizes, 
occupation and industry), the data indicates the usual weekly hours worked last year and weeks 
worked last year.50  
     In Table 1, I report the summary statistics for the entire sample and the states with and 
without access to mental health parity separately.51 Workers in parity states have similar hours 
and weeks worked and a slightly higher possibility of being part-time than ones in non-parity 
states.52 Differences in other demographics characteristics between parity states and non-parity 
states are not very striking.  
 
                                                          
50 After I limit my sample to workers in private sector, both the hours and weeks worked reported by them are 
positive numbers. There is no need to consider about “0” when I take log on them in regression analysis. 
51 Parity states: states with comprehensive or limited parity laws. Non-parity states refer to all other states.   
52 The latest Internal Revenue Service nondiscrimination rule (Internal Revenue Bulletin:  2015-2) defines full-time 
employees are employees who are expected to work more than 30 hours/week. But part-year workers are also 
exempted from the benefits. Section 1.410(a)(-3)(e)(2) (The code from Employee Plans Division) requires 1000 
hours/year of service as a condition of participation, also excludes a part-time or seasonal employee. Thus I use 25 
hours/week as a cutoff of part-time workers who are most likely to be exempted from group health insurance by 
assuming non-seasonal employee works at least 40 weeks/year. 
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Table 1:     
Summary Statistics: Weighted Means   
 All states (51) Parity states (28) Non-Parity states (23)  
Outcomes    
Hours/week 40.576 40.421 40.791 
 (10.275) (10.226) (10.337) 
Weeks/year 47.561 47.528 47.605 
 (10.732) (10.757) (10.696) 
Part-time 0.069 0.072 0.066 
 (0.254) (0.258) (0.249) 
Coverage 0.753 0.756 0.750 
 (0.431) (0.430) (0.433) 
Demographics    
Age 41.126 41.116 41.141 
 (10.381) (10.372) (10.394) 
Male 0.534 0.534 0.533 
 (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) 
Non-white 0.170 0.179 0.157 
 (0.376) (0.384) (0.364) 
Married 0.630 0.624 0.638 
 (0.483) (0.484) (0.481) 
Number of  0.197 0.196 0.198 
children under 5 (0.496) (0.494) (0.499) 
Less than high school 0.117 0.118 0.117 
 (0.322) (0.322) (0.321) 
High school 0.334 0.324 0.349 
 (0.472) (0.468) (0.477) 
Some college 0.281 0.274 0.290 
 (0.449) (0.446) (0.454) 
Bachelor 0.268 0.285 0.244 
 (0.443) (0.451) (0.430) 
N 1025094 594602 430492 
Notes: Supplement weights are used. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Sample used is pooled CPS 
March supplement from 1992 to 2010. Observations restricted to workers between age 25 and 64 in private sectors.  
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     I estimate the impact of state parity laws by accessing the change in working time of workers 
in states with parity from before to after policy adoption, and comparing it to the change in 
working time of workers in states that do not adopt mental health parity. To control for other 
determinants and any systematic shocks to the labor-market outcomes of the treatment states that 
are correlated with, but not due to, the enactment of parity laws, I use the basic estimating 
equation as follows: 
                         𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜋𝑗 ∙ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝜖                        (4) 
     In this equation, the dependent variable  𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is one of the measures of working time for the 
worker 𝑖 in state 𝑗 reported in year 𝑡. I code a state as having parity law in year 𝑡 if it has been 
effective by the last day of year 𝑡 − 1, thus 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡−1  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if state 
ever had mental health parity law, and 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  indexes a set of individual level 
characteristics: age, gender, educational attainment, race, marital status, the number of children 
under 5, union membership, firm size, occupation and industry.53 The regression specification 
includes state fixed effects 𝛾𝑗, to control for any differences across states in working time 
patterns, including any working time differences between the states that adopted parity and those 
that did not, and year fixed effects 𝛿𝑡 to capture any national trends in working time. It also 
includes region-by-year effects to control for region-specific shocks over this period which are 
correlated with the passage of these laws, and state-specific time trends can deal with the slow-
                                                          
53 CPS March supplement recoded the occupations and industries since 2003, I code occupations of all these years 
into six broad occupational categories using the previous version of definition before 2003. As for industries, I group 
all industry codes into 11 major categories according to “Revisions to the Current Population Survey Effective in 
January 2003” given by Mary Bowler, Randy E. Ilg, Stephen Miller, Ed Robison, and Anne Polivka. 
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moving trends in each state. The key coefficient 𝛽1 represents the effect of state mental health 
parity on working time. 
     This method requires one identifying assumption that the trends picked up by parity laws did 
not exist prior to the enactment. And it also requires there is no contemporaneous shock that 
affects the relative outcomes in the same state-years as parity laws. The fact that the wide-spread 
legislative activities on mental health parity change every state by year during a long time period 
makes the assumptions above fairly weak ones. In addition, there is one potential selection issue 
about limiting sample to individuals who have employment, because parity laws may affect the 
employment outcome. To relieve this concern, I examine the effect of state parity laws on 
employment as one of the robustness checks in Section 7. 
4.2 Basic results 
     Table 2 illustrates the regression results of equation (4): the estimates are weighted to make 
the sample nationally representative. The standard errors are clustered at the state level to control 
for the autocorrelation within states over time. Columns (1) to (4) report the estimators of parity 
laws on four outcomes of interest separately: usual hours worked per week, weeks worked last 
year, whether the worker works as a part-time (less than 25 hours/week) and group insurance 
coverage.54 Working time (such as hours and weeks) is measured in logs. The OLS effect of 
mental health parity on working time suggests that having state mental health parity law leads to 
a 1.4% increase in weeks worked based on column (2) (statistically significant at 1% level).  
                                                          
54 Under this context, the better measurement of coverage prevalence is having group insurance coverage under own 
name, but CPS March supplement only has this information about policy holder of own name after 1996. Thus in 
state parity analysis, I just use group insurance coverage. In federal experiments, I use group insurance coverage of 
own name. 
71 
 
While columns (1) and (3) show no statistically significant effect on hours worked and the 
probability of being part-time workers.  
     As discussed above, we might expect the rising health insurance costs driven by the 
enactment of state parity, or the improved productivity caused by better mental health care 
access to increase the weeks, but as for hours worked, the results could be ambiguous because 
parity laws may increase hours worked for full time workers while increase the demand of low-
hour workers at the same time.55 Maybe that is the reason why I could not estimate any 
significant effect of parity laws on hours worked. Also, no significant result about the impact on 
group coverage is found according to column (4). The small positive coefficient may partly 
because of adverse selection that mental health benefits attract a pool of high risk consumers. 
And the covariates have their expected effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55 In Culter and Madrian (1998), they limit their sample to the workers who work more than 40 weeks/year.  
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Table 2 
The Effect of State Parity Laws on Working Time and Coverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log hours/week Log weeks/year Part-time ESI coverage 
Parity -0.006 0.014*** 0.005 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
     
Age 0.012*** 0.006*** -0.006*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Age square -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Male 0.144*** 0.039*** -0.072*** -0.011*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Non-white 0.001 -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.057*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) 
     
Married -0.019*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.131*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
Number of 
children under 5  
-0.023*** 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.022*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
     
Lower than  
high school 
-0.027*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.207*** 
(0.012) 
     
High school -0.016*** 0.006*** -0.016*** -0.053*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
     
Some college -0.020*** 0.004* -0.004* -0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
Union member -0.000 0.014*** -0.011*** 0.093*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
     
Under 25 
employees 
-0.074*** 
(0.002) 
-0.030*** 
(0.003) 
0.050*** 
(0.002) 
-0.205*** 
(0.008) 
     
Employees  
25-99 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.064*** 
(0.005) 
     
Employees 
100-499 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.022*** 
(0.004) 
     
Employees  
500- 999 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
     
N 195534 195534 195534 195534 
Note: All regression models include the following additional variables: industries (11 dummy variables), occupations 
(6 dummy variables), year dummy variables, state dummy variables, state-trend and region by year dummies. Omitted 
education category is “bachelor or higher”. Omitted firm size category is “more than 1000 employees”.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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     To further examine whether certain age group or gender are more likely to be affected by the 
state mental health parity laws, I estimate equation (4) separately by genders and for four age 
groups (in 10-year age intervals) of workers and report the results in Table 3. As shown in 
column (1), state parity reduces the hours worked by 1.7 % for workers aged 35-44, and column 
(3) provides support for the previous hypothesis that hours are reduced because more part-time 
workers are employed to avoid higher fixed cost: parity increases the likelihood that a worker is 
employed as a part-time by 1.8 percentage points. What is more, column (2) presents which kind 
of workers would be more likely increased weeks worked because of parity law. Female workers 
and older workers (at least older than 35 years old) increase their weeks worked more than 
others, as female and older age workers may have higher risk of mental illness based on the 
report of World Health Organization (WHO).  
Table 3     
The Effect of State Parity Laws on Working Time for Different Types of Workers  
 
(1) Hours/week 
 
(2) Weeks/year 
 
(3) Part-time 
 
(4) N 
 
Gender     
Men -0.008 0.009 0.003 102044 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)  
Women -0.004 0.019*** 0.007 93490 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)  
Age     
25-34 -0.007 0.006 0.003 58219 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)  
35-44 -0.017** 0.011** 0.018** 63476 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)  
45-54 0.006 0.022*** -0.005 49687 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)  
55-64 -0.001 0.026*** -0.003 24152 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)  
Notes: Supplement weights are used. Sample used is pooled CPS March supplement from 1992 to 2010. 
Observations restricted to workers between age 25 and 64 in private sectors.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.3 The role of state parity laws in small-group 
     As mentioned in the state policy introduction, self-insured groups are exempted from the state 
regulations including mental health parity laws because of ERISA. Thus state parity laws do not 
impact the self-insured groups as same as fully insured ones. But the decision of being self-
insured may be endogenous to state-mandated benefits. Also, the data does not contain the 
information whether the worker is employed in a self-insured company. Therefore, instead of the 
real status of firm, I use firm size to proxy its likelihood of being self-insured: among firms with 
less than 500 employees, only around 20% of them are self-insured while more than 80% of 
larger firms with more than 500 employees are self-insured (MEPS-IC 2012). And almost 90% 
of firms choose self-insurance when they have more than 1000 employees. I examine the effect 
of state mental health parity for small-group (less than 500 employees) by allowing separate 
parity effects on different firm sizes in this section.56 
 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑡−1 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋𝛽4 
                               +𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜋𝑗 ∙ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝜖                                                                               (6) 
     In this case, 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡=1 if worker 𝑖 in state 𝑗 in year 𝑡 works in a small firm, otherwise it 
is 0. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽3 shown in Table 4. As expected, the effect of state parity on 
weeks/year for small firms is almost twice as large as the effect for large firms that are more 
likely to be self-insured. In column (2), the average increased weeks for having parity laws differ 
                                                          
56 I also drop the workers in firms with 500-1000 employees and only compare the firms with less than 500 
employees and firms with more than 1000 employees using equation (6), the estimator of interaction term is quite 
similar, and the main coefficient of parity is not significant any more. 
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from workers in small firms and others by 0.8%, with small firms have larger effect of parity on 
working weeks. The covariates in the model still have their expected effects. 
Table 4 
The Effect of State Parity Laws for Small firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log hours/week Log weeks/year Part-time ESI coverage 
Parity× 
Small firm 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
     
Parity -0.007 0.010*** 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) 
     
Small firm -0.031*** -0.020*** 0.018*** -0.109*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) 
     
Age 0.012*** 0.006*** -0.007*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Age square -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Male 0.144*** 0.039*** -0.072*** -0.010*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Non-white 0.003 -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.052*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) 
     
Married -0.020*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.130*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
Number of 
children under 5 
-0.023*** 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.022*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
     
Lower than  
high school 
-0.030*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.213*** 
(0.013) 
     
High school -0.017*** 0.006** -0.015*** -0.055*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
     
Some college -0.021*** 0.003* -0.004* -0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
Union member 0.005* 0.016*** -0.015*** 0.106*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
     
N 195534 195534 195534 195534 
Notes: Define small firm as one with fewer than 500 employees.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5. The Effect of Federal Mental Health Parity Laws 
5.1 Data and methodology  
     The second goal of this analysis is to investigate the effects of two mental health parity laws 
at the federal level (effective separately in 1998 and 2010) on working time. This set of laws 
provides another distinct opportunity to check the impact of mental health parity on working 
time, and further support the findings from previous experiments using state parity laws. 
     According to the effective year of MHPA, I am able to use five states that had already passed 
parity or mandate offering laws before 1997 as non-experimental states, because their state parity 
laws are stronger than federal law and their health insurance costs are not affected a lot by the 
federal parity law. On the other side, there are 28 states that had not enacted by parity laws 
before 2001 are experimental.57 However, the remaining 18 states with state parity law changes 
during 1997-2000 cannot be studied simultaneously to identify the impact of MHPA, because the 
year 1997-2000 includes the periods before and after the federal law was put in the place (1998). 
In this case, the enactment of these state parity laws will provide counterfactual trends thus I 
dropped these 18 states from the sample. The experimental, non-experimental and dropped states 
are shown in Panel A of Fig. 2. And I use the 1997 and 1998 (before), and 2000 and 2001 (after) 
CPS March supplement to study the earlier federal law MHPA.58 
 
                                                          
57 Among the firms with more than 50 employees in states that do not have state parity laws, 86% of them are 
complying with MHPA 1996 while only 55% complied before 1996. And there is no employer drop the coverage 
according to a survey of US GAO (2000). 
58 To provide sufficient time to examine the effect of MHPA, I drop the year 1999. 
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Fig. 2. Experimental and Non-experimental states under MHPA 
     But one issue for this MHPA experiment is that only 5 states can be used as non-experimental 
states and they are only limited in three regions: New England, South Atlantic, and West North 
Central. To find more effective experimental states that are more similar with these 5 non-
experimental states, I only keep 10 experimental states from New England, South Atlantic, and 
West North Central and drop other experimental states. Thus I have another set of experimental 
states that are used to compare with non-experimental states before and after MHPA. They are 
shown in Panel B of Fig. 2. And Table 5 contains standard demographic information by state 
status during the MHPA study period, for both of two sets of experimental states. There are not 
many striking differences between experimental and non-experimental states: only a small 
disparity on children number and education level.  
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Table 5: 
Demographic Characteristics by Treatment Status: MHPA1996  
   
 Panel A: All regions 
 
Panel B: Limited regions:  
    
 (1) Experimental  
States: 28  
(2) Non-experimental 
States: 5 
 
(3) Experimental  
States: 10 
(4) Non-experimental 
States: 5 
Age 40.813 40.813 40.981 40.813 
 (10.122) (10.057) (10.239) (10.057) 
Male 0.530 0.522 0.524 0.522 
 (0.499) (0.500) (0.499) (0.500) 
Non-white 0.149 0.152 0.154 0.152 
 (0.356) (0.359) (0.361) (0.359) 
Married 0.636 0.651 0.625 0.651 
 (0.481) (0.477) (0.484) (0.477) 
Number of  0.196 0.208 0.184 0.208 
children under 5 (0.496) (0.509) (0.478) (0.509) 
Less than  0.115 0.079 0.121 0.079 
high school (0.319) (0.270) (0.326) (0.270) 
High school 0.354 0.332 0.354 0.332 
 (0.478) (0.471) (0.478) (0.471) 
Some college 0.281 0.280 0.276 0.280 
 (0.450) (0.449) (0.447) (0.449) 
Bachelor 0.250 0.309 0.249 0.309 
 (0.433) (0.462) (0.432) (0.462) 
N 139670 15181 41091 15181 
Notes: Supplement weights are used. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Sample used is pooled CPS 
March supplement from 1997 to 2001. Observations restricted to workers between age 25 and 64 in private sectors. 
Limited regions: New England, South Atlantic, West North Central. 
 
     Compared to MHPA, the later federal law MHPAEA requires stronger mental health parity, 
then it may thus impact the labor market more substantially than the earlier law.59 What is more, 
one advantage of this later “federal experiment” is that by its later enactment year (2008) over 
half of the states had already passed their own parity or mandate offering laws, and no states had 
                                                          
59 Even with all of the state parity laws as well as MHPA, there still exist differences in group health insurance for 
MH/SA. Before MHPAEA, coverage for mental health care often required a higher level of cost sharing (e.g., 
coinsurance of 50 percent compared with 20 percent for outpatient medical services) and treatment limits (e.g., 
twenty outpatient visits and thirty inpatient days per year). Thus the requirements of MHPAEA can eliminate these 
historical differences further and aim to create the comprehensive “mental health parity”.  
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law change after that. So that I am able to use all states to broadly represent the country. In this 
case, experimental states are those that had not passed parity or mandate offering laws before 
2009, and non-experimental states are others that already had their own laws. Fig. 3 presents 18 
experimental states and 33 non-experimental states. MHPAEA became effective in 2010, 
therefore I use the year 2009 and 2010 as pre-period and 2012 and 2013 as post-period. And 
column (1) and (2) in Panel A of Table 6 present the means of demographic characteristics for 
MHPAEA experimental states and non-experimental states. Once again, the two sets of states are 
fairly similar: the experimental states have slightly lower educational levels and higher rate of 
non-while. 
 
Fig. 3. Experimental and Non-experimental states under MHPAEA 
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Table 6 
Demographic Characteristics by Treatment Status: MHPAEA2008 
 Panel A: All states by status Panel B: Control states by firm size 
 
(1) Experimental  
states (18) 
(2) Non-experimental  
states (33) 
(3) Large firms 
(>500 employees) 
(4) Small firms 
(<500 employees) 
Age 42.740 42.578 42.720 42.469 
 (10.982) (10.937) (10.908) (10.959) 
Male 0.532 0.532 0.520 0.541 
 (0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.498) 
Non-white 0.168 0.212 0.232 0.197 
 (0.374) (0.409) (0.422) (0.398) 
Married 0.607 0.600 0.606 0.596 
 (0.488) (0.490) (0.489) (0.491) 
Number of  0.179 0.180 0.183 0.177 
children under 5 (0.482) (0.477) (0.481) (0.475) 
Less than high 0.100 0.095 0.058 0.123 
school (0.300) (0.293) (0.234) (0.329) 
High school 0.311 0.290 0.260 0.313 
 (0.463) (0.454) (0.439) (0.464) 
Some college 0.298 0.281 0.291 0.274 
 (0.457) (0.450) (0.454) (0.446) 
Bachelor 0.291 0.334 0.391 0.290 
 (0.454) (0.472) (0.488) (0.454) 
N 104638 202912 87275 115637 
Note: Supplement weights are used. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Sample used is pooled CPS 
March supplement from 2009 to 2013. Observations restricted to workers between age 25 and 64 in private sectors.  
 
     The effects of MHPA and MHPAEA on working time can be both estimated from the 
equation as follows: 
                                    𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝛽2 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜋𝑗 ∙ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖                        (5) 
     In this equation, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 equals 1 if state is experimental and 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a 
dummy for after-law period (1 if post-federal, 0 if pre-federal). Along with demographic 
covariates, it also contains state and year fixed effects and region-by-year effects. 𝛽1 captures the 
variation in outcomes specific to the experimental states in the years after the enactment of 
federal parity laws. This is the difference-in-differences estimate of the extent of shifting of the 
81 
 
costs of federal parity laws to working time. The underlying assumption for a valid identification 
is that without federal parity laws, the working time or other related labor market outcomes 
should follow similar trends for both experimental states and non-experimental states during the 
post-period. The relevant assumption and robustness checks will be provided in Section 7. 
     As discussed above, the federal parity law fills the regulatory gap created by ERISA. On the 
contrary to state mental health parity laws, federal parity law can influence the behavior of self-
insured firms if they provide mental health coverage with discriminations. But estimating the 
effects for fully insured and self-insured firms separately in experimental states is not feasible 
because both types of firms are affected by federal parity simultaneously. Nevertheless, among 
the 33 non-experimental states that had already adopted state mental health parity before 2009, 
MHPAEA is supposed to have more sizeable impact on their self-insured firms. Limiting the 
sample to those non-experimental states, I use large firms (more than 500 employees, more likely 
to be self-insured) as treatment group and other firms as control group, to further investigate the 
effect of MHPAEA using a difference-in-differences estimation.60  Column (3) and (4) in Panel 
B of Table 6 report the means of demographic characteristics for large firms and small firms.61 
The regression framework has the following form:  
              𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝛽3 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜋𝑗 ∙ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖            (6) 
                                                          
60 I also drop the workers in firms with 500-1000 employees to only compare the firms with more than 1000 
employees and firms with less than 500 employees. The estimators of key variables are similar with results reported 
in Table 9. 
61 Basically, similar methodology can be also used in “MHPA experiment” to identify the effect of the earlier federal 
law for self-insured firms. But there are only five non-experimental states in “MHPA experiment”, and the pre-
trends in labor market outcomes between large firms and small firms are not very similar. Therefore, I do not report 
the results in this section.  
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     In equation (6), 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡=1 if worker 𝑖 in state 𝑗 in year 𝑡 works in a large firm, 
otherwise it is 0. The key variable is 𝛽2, which measures the effect of MHPAEA on working time 
among self-insured firms. The rest part of this regression has similar analogy with equation (5). 
     5.2 The results of MHPA experiment 
     Panel A in Table 7 reports the estimation results of the key variable in equation (5) when 
comparing 28 experimental states and 5 non-experimental states in all regions. The insignificant 
coefficients of interaction term from column (1) to (4) imply that the 1996 federal parity law 
MHPA does not change these labor market outcomes significantly. In addition, I re-estimate the 
effect of MHPA using another set of experimental states. These 10 states are limited to three 
specific regions where the original 5 non-experimental states are located. The results are 
presented in the Panel B of Table 7. Once again, it still shows that MHPA has little effect on 
working time.  
     There are two reasons to believe that MHPA has limited ability to impact working time. First, 
MHPA is a very weak federal parity law comparing to other state parity laws; the requirement of 
its mandated benefits may not be binding with the existing group health plan design, especially 
in large firms. In this scenario, the costs of providing group health insurance coverage may not 
be increased substantially after the implementation of MHPA. Second, as an important symbolic 
accomplishment, MHPA prompts state legislatures to step into more comprehensive parity laws. 
One disadvantage is that several parity laws enactments have been pushing around the approved 
and effective year of MHPA (1997-2001). Then I lost a lot of observations in the empirical work 
of MHPA since these states are dropped to rule out these counterfactual factors. But MHPAEA 
enacted in 2008 should be able to fix this issue and the relevant results are provided as follows. 
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Table 7: 
The Effect of MHPA1996 on Working Time and Coverage  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log hours/week Log weeks/year Part-time ESI own coverage 
Panel A: All regions 
 
Experimental 
States×Post 
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.007) 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
 
 
0.003 
(0.005) 
 
 
0.013 
(0.017) 
N 27575 27575 27575 27575 
Panel B: Limited 
regions 
    
 
Experimental 
States×Post 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.007) 
 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
 
0.002 
(0.005) 
 
0.012 
(0.017) 
N 10517 10517 10517 10517 
Note: Both regression models include the following additional variables: industries (11 dummy variables), occupations 
(6 dummy variables), year dummy variables, state dummy variables, and region by year dummies. Omitted education 
category is “bachelor or higher”. Omitted firm size category is “more than 1000 employees”. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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5.3 The results of MHPAEA experiment 
     The 2008 federal law MHPAEA can be studied within the same DD framework used in the 
empirical work of MHPA, with changes in choosing experimental and non-experimental states as 
well as pre-post periods. The results are shown in Table 8. There is an evidence of increasing 
weeks worked/year associated with MHPAEA enactment. In column (2), the treatment effect of 
MHPAEA is: having federal law increases the weeks worked by 1.7% and is significant at the 
99% level. The magnitude is quite similar to the effect of state mental health parity laws. But 
there is still no significant effect on hours worked/week, probability of being part-time workers 
and group insurance coverage of own name.62 Overall, to the extent that the effect of MHPAEA 
on working time is correctly estimated, this 2008 federal law is stronger than MHPA thus it 
causes costs to rise more and make the labor demand and labor supply shift more. And the 
experiment of MHPAEA thus able to support the previous findings about state parity laws; 
mental health parity laws do increase the weeks worked. 
     The estimated results of the key variable in equation (6) are shown in Table 9. The estimators 
show no significant treatment effect of MHPAEA on working time for large firms compared to 
small ones. This lack of an effect may be because the health plans offered by large firms already 
have had comprehensive coverage for mental health care even in the absence of parity laws. This 
federal mandate is not binding for large firms and the health plan benefits and their generosity 
does not need to redesign much to comply the requirements of MHPAEA. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62 I use coverage of own name in both of the federal law experiments because of the data availability.  
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Table 8 
The Effect of MHPAEA2008 on Working Time and Coverage  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log hours/week Log weeks/year Part-time ESI own coverage 
Experimental 
States×Post 
0.007 
(0.007)  
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
0.015 
(0.010) 
     
Age 0.014*** 0.007*** -0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
     
Age square -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Male 0.120*** 0.021*** -0.062*** 0.072*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
     
Non-white 0.000 -0.008* -0.011*** -0.038*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
     
Married -0.001 0.013*** 0.011*** -0.078*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) 
     
Number of 
children under 5 
-0.014** 
(0.005) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
     
Lower than  
high school 
-0.055*** 
(0.010) 
-0.040*** 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.232*** 
(0.013) 
     
High school -0.025*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.075*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
     
Some college -0.029*** -0.002 0.004 -0.050*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
     
Union member 0.005 0.008 -0.007 0.151*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) 
     
Under 11 
employees 
-0.102*** 
(0.008) 
-0.032*** 
(0.008) 
0.074*** 
(0.005) 
-0.360*** 
(0.011) 
     
Employees 
11-99 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.179*** 
(0.008) 
     
Employees 
100-499 
0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.044*** 
(0.011) 
     
Employees 
500-999 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.036** 
(0.014) 
     
N 36162 36162 36162 36162 
Note: Both regression models include the following additional variables: industries (11 dummy variables), occupations 
(6 dummy variables), year dummy variables, state dummy variables, and region by year dummies. Omitted education 
category is “bachelor or higher”. Omitted firm size category is “more than 1000 employees”. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
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Table 9 
The Effect of MHPAE2008 for Large Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log hours/week Log weeks/year Part-time ESI own coverage 
Large firm× Post 0.007 -0.013 -0.002 0.015 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) 
     
N 23752 23752 23752 23752 
Notes: Samples are limited in 33 non-experiment states of “MHPAEA experiment”. Define large firm as one with 
more than 500 employees.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
6. Robustness Checks 
6.1 The effect of mental health parity laws on employment 
     I restrict my sample to individuals who have employment in the above econometric analysis 
because they are the mostly affected by parity laws. However, there is a concern that the 
estimators would be biased if mental health parity laws also change employment itself 
significantly. As discussed in the previous literature, the labor supply may be increased if the 
employees value the mental health coverage. On the other hand, employers may decrease the 
labor demand of health insurance covered workers while become more reliable on part-time 
workers to avoid higher fixed costs. Thus the effect of mental health parity laws on equilibrium 
employment is uncertain. In light of this potential sample selection problem, I check whether 
state or federal mental health parity laws have impacts on employment and labor participation 
with similar regression specifications used above. The results of state mental health parity laws, 
MHPA federal law (for two sets of experimental states), and MHPAEA federal law are shown 
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separately in Table 9 and Table 10. There is no evidence of significant effects on employment or 
labor participation.63 
Table 10 
The Effect of State Parity Laws on Employment and Labor Participation 
 (1) (2) 
 Employment Labor participation 
Parity 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
   
Age 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Age square -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Male 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
   
Non-white -0.026*** -0.002*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
   
Married 0.030*** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
   
Number of children under 5 -0.006*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
   
Lower than high school  -0.050*** -0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
   
High school -0.015*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
   
Some college -0.009*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
N 
Mean of Dep.Var. 
1392406 
0.752 
1392406 
0.793 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 The pre-post trends in employment and labor participation are shown in Appendix. Both the experimental states 
and non-experimental states have roughly similar trends before and after the enactment of MHPA/MHPAEA.  
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Table 11 
The Effect of Federal Parity Laws on Employment and Labor Participation 
 MHPA: All states MHPA: Limited regions MHPAEA 
 (1) 
Employment 
(2) 
Labor 
participation 
(3) 
Employment 
(4) 
Labor 
participation 
(5) 
Employment 
(6) 
Labor 
participation 
Experimental 
States×Post 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
       
Age 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Age square -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Male 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006** 0.005*** 0.002 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
       
Non-white -0.023*** -0.003*** -0.021*** -0.002** -0.031*** -0.001** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
       
Married 0.021*** 0.001 0.017*** -0.001 0.043*** 0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
       
Number of 
children under 5 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
       
Lower than  
high school 
-0.039*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.032*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.062*** 
(0.005) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
       
High school -0.010*** -0.001** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.029*** -0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
       
Some college -0.005*** -0.000 -0.007*** -0.001 -0.018*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
N 
Mean of 
Dep.Var. 
206419 
0.773 
206419 
0.803 
75799 
0.791 
75799 
0.817 
421183 
0.717 
421183 
0.779 
Note: All regression models include the following additional variables: industries (11 dummy variables), occupations 
(6 dummy variables), year dummy variables, state dummy variables, region by year dummies. Omitted education 
category is “bachelor or higher”.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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6.2 Identification assumption check of DD estimations 
     In considering the identification strategy of studying the effect of federal parity laws on 
working time, the interpretation of the preceding results is based on one key assumption: in the 
absence of federal parity laws, the labor market outcomes I check in Section 6 would have 
similar trends during the post-period. This section seeks to check this assumption by providing 
the pre and post trends of outcomes of interest for both the 1996 and 2008 federal laws.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Trends in four outcomes for MHPA 
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     Fig. 4 compares the trends of experimental states with non-experimental states in four labor 
market outcomes of interest before and after the implementation of MHPA (I use one-year lag 
for the actual effective year to provide longer time period for behavior adjustment). Panel A-
Panel D report four labor market outcomes of interest: usually hours worked per week, weeks 
worked last year, percent of part-time workers and ESI coverage under own name. The pre-
trends of two sets of states before 1999 are a little noise, and there is no substantial increase or 
decrease in all of the outcomes after 1999. The comparisons of experimental states and non-
experimental states in limited regions are also provided in Fig. 5. They have similar patterns with 
the plots using all regions. According to these plots, it is inconclusive about whether MHPA 
impact the outcomes, consistent with the results of previous econometric regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
  
 
Fig. 5. Trends in four outcomes for MHPA in limited regions 
     MHPAEA provides better experimental and non-experimental states for estimating the DD 
estimator. Using a regression framework, I find this later federal parity increases the weeks for 
experimental states. When I check their pre-trends in Fig. 6, very similar trends in every outcome 
before the MHPAEA (the year 2011) are found, but there is a slightly increasing trend for 
experimental states compare to non-experimental states shortly after MHPAEA was 
implemented. Thus the concern that the increased weeks worked is coming from pre-existing 
trend can be relieved.    
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Fig. 6. Trends in four outcomes for MHPAEA  
     Along with the trend comparisons between experimental states and non-experimental states, I 
also plot the pre and after trends of large firms (>500 employees) and small firms (<500 
employees) in non-experimental states. Fig. 7 indicates that between 2009 and 2013, all of the 
four outcomes of large firms and small firms exhibit roughly similar trends before and after the 
implementation of MHPAEA. It is also consistent with the regression results that there is no 
much of the change driven by MHPAEA in the analysis above. 
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Fig. 7. Trends in four outcomes for MHPAEA in non-experimental states 
7. Discussion about the mechanisms of increasing working time 
     In this section, I would like to revisit and discuss the mechanisms related to the causal effect 
of mental health parity laws on working time. Recall that the whole story can be separated into 
the labor demand side and the labor supply side. The health insurance costs raised by 
implementation of parity laws may decrease the labor demand, and further provide incentives for 
employers to ask longer working time per worker when the costs cannot transfer to wages 
completely. On the other side, the extensive and intensive labor supply may both be increased if 
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employees want to take advantage about the new mandated benefits. Additionally, workers could 
also able to work for a longer time if their mental health outcomes are improved by mental health 
parity laws. But because of data limitation, the estimates of mental health parity laws cannot 
imply which channel is the most significant mechanism for increased weeks empirically. 
     Theoretically, although increasing the mental health coverage is necessary precondition for 
improvement of mental health care utilization and mental health outcomes, the expansions in 
benefits may not translate into increased utilization and better health. Most of the literature do 
not find strong evidences on the effect of parity on either of mental health care utilization and 
mental health outcomes for the early stage parity laws, and there are a few suggestive evidence 
on the later parity laws improve the utilization.64 But my state and federal experiments show 
similar positive effects on working weeks no matter whether mental health outcomes have been 
improved. Thus if the evidence on the effect of mental health parity laws on mental health is 
lacking, the possibility that workers increase their working time because they gain better mental 
health from enactment of mental parity laws is low. 
     Additionally, mental health is also found to have significant influence on employment while 
the effect is limited on working time (Ettner et al, 1997). Because even though employees can 
obtain better mental health care utilization and mental health as well because of parity laws, their 
working time may not be increased. One of the possibilities is that better access may make 
covered employees to spend more time on psychological therapy or psychologist visit and reduce 
the working time in this scenario.  
                                                          
64 See section 3 for more details about the existing literature about the effect of parity on mental health care access 
and mental health conditions.  
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     To provide more suggestive evidences for the mechanisms, I re-estimate the effect of state 
mental health parity laws on working time and group insurance coverage by allowing separate 
effects on metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties. Metropolitan areas usually own high 
degree of economic and social interaction, and of course significantly more mental health 
services, such as community mental health centers, community hospitals with psychiatric units 
and state-operated hospitals.65 Rural counties have fewest average mental health professional per 
capita (Ellis, Konrad, Thomas and Morrissey, 2009). If the increased working weeks are coming 
from better mental health, the areas with more mental health services should be more likely to be 
affected by the parity dummy.66 Table 12 reports the results and they shows that there is no 
significant difference between the effects on metro-county and non-metro-county. Thus I would 
like to assume that the working time increased by parity laws implies either an increase in health 
insurance costs or an outward shift in labor supply curve, but not an improvement of mental 
health outcome. The results cannot be served as evidence on the benefit side of parity laws at 
least for the general population.  
Table 12 
The Effect of Parity Laws for Metropolitan Area 
 (1) 
Log hours/week 
(2) 
Log weeks/year 
(3) 
Part-time 
(4) 
ESI coverage 
Parity -0.001 0.011* 0.005 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) 
     
Metro× Parity -0.005 0.004 -0.0007 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) 
     
Metro 0.001 0.005 0.0005 0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
 
N 195534 195534 195534 195534 
Note: Metropolitan area includes central city, outside central city and central city status unknown. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, *** p < 0.01 
                                                          
65 These are the main resources that individuals with mental illness can get medical supports from in US. 
66 Actually, my results of interaction terms of parity laws and firm size can also imply similar conclusions. Because 
the health plans of large firms often have more access to mental health services, but the effect is still larger for small 
firms. 
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8. Conclusions 
     The evidence in this study supports that the implementation of mental health parity laws does 
increase the intensive labor supply margin: weeks worked. With well-supported identification 
assumptions, my findings about the effects of state and federal parity laws are robust to a variety 
of specifications of the regulations. First of all, the development of state legislatures about 
mental health parity provides abundant state-by-year variation during 1992-2010. Furthermore, 
MHPA effective in 1998 and MHPAEA effective in 2010 also offer opportunities to do “reverse 
experiments”. By comparing the states that had already adopted state parity before the federal 
laws and states that had not, the effect of federal parity laws can be examined and the previous 
findings about state parity can have further support. At last but not least, the self-insured firms 
(most of large firms) are exempted from the regulations of state mandates while federal parity 
laws fix this regulatory gap created by ERISA. Thus the effects of state and federal parity laws 
on working time should vary by different firm sizes. I also estimate the effect of state parity laws 
for small firms and the effect of federal parity laws for large firms separately by adding 
interaction term of parity law and firm size.  
     The estimates indicate weeks worked per year are increased significantly because of the 
implementation of state mental health parity and federal mental health parity MHPAEA. 
Comparing to self-insured firms, this effect of state mental parity for fully insured firms is more 
substantial. Additionally, even though there is no evidence to imply that having mental health 
parity laws impacts hours worked for the whole sample significantly, it decreases the hours 
worked while increases the probability of working part-time for the workers aged 35-44. These 
results support the convention that adding requirements of equal coverage of mental health and 
physical health does increase the fixed costs of providing group coverage, and the employers 
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who are affected by parity laws are more likely to ask their workers to work longer time to 
compensate the higher fixed costs. And workers also value the benefits and would like to work 
longer to take advantage of them. 
     These results about mental health parity laws have suggestive implications for other policies 
designed to cover the uninsured and mandate comprehensive benefits. It is also necessary to 
highlight that federal parity law MHPAEA is still effective after the full implementation of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). This new health care reform, which was 
passed by Congress and signed into law by the president in 2010, specifies that the applicability 
of MHPAEA will be extended by PPACA.67  Based on the experiment of this federal parity law, 
one of the policy implications can be to illustrate that the effect of PPACA, which can be 
considered as a comprehensive mandate for health insurance coverage. The compliance of 
PPACA may increase the fixed costs of hiring covered workers or motivate ineligible employees 
to work longer time. Thus it may impact relevant labor market outcomes more substantially than 
other types of single mandated benefit.  
     At last, this analysis only focuses on the intensive margin of labor force participation; the goal 
of the paper is not trying to study the incidence of mental health parity laws completely. I have 
focused purely on the hypothesis that working time will be longer when employers encounter a 
higher fixed cost of employment and employees value their health benefits. The results of my 
analysis detect similar effect found by Cutler and Madrian (1998), although they focus on hour 
worked and I only find evidence in weeks. Because they only look at the full-year workers and I 
include all types of workers. Also, I solely look at the effect of mental health parity law on the 
                                                          
67 The PPACA expands the reach of MHPAEA to three main types of plans: qualified health plans, Medicaid non-
managed care benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans, and plans of individual market.  
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financing side and efficiency costs instead of the potential benefits of these mandates. The 
benefit and cost analysis on mental health parity laws still remains an area of priority for future 
policy research. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Time of state parity law legislation 
State Minimum Benefit Mandate Offer Parity law Source  
Alabama  2001   NAMI,DHHS,BSBC  
Alaska 2009   NCSL, state law  
Arizona 1998   DHHS,NCSL,NAMI  
Arkansas 1983  1997 All   
California 1974  2000 DHHS,NCSL,NAMI  
Colorado 1992  1998 DHHS,BCBS,NAMI  
Connecticut   2000 NAMI,DHHS,NCSL  
Delaware   1999  All   
Washington DC 1987   BCBS,NAMI,state law 
Florida 1992   DHHS, state law  
Georgia 1984 1998  BCBS, NAMI,state law 
Hawaii 1988  1999 NAMI,DHHS, state law 
Idaho    All   
Illinois 1991  2002 DHHS, state law  
Indiana   2000 NAMI,state law,insure.com  
Iowa 2006   NCSL,NAMI,state law 
Kansas 1998   DHHS,state law  
Kentucky 1987 2000  DHHS,NAMI,state law 
Louisiana 1982  2000 DHHS,BCBS,state law 
Maine 1984   1996 NCSL,NAMI,DHHS  
Maryland   1994 NAMI,BCBS,state law 
Massachusetts 1973  2001 All   
Michigan 2001   DHHS,NAMI,state law 
Minnesota 1976 1995  DHHS,NAMI,state law 
Mississippi 2002   NCSL,NAMI,DHHS  
Missouri 1991 2000 2005 DHHS,NAMI, state law 
Montana 1987  2000 NCSL, NAMI,state law 
Nebraska 2000   NAMI, NCSL,state law 
Nevada 2000   All   
New Hampshire 1975  1995 NCSL,NAMI,DHHS  
New Jersey   1999 All   
New Mexico   2000 All   
New York 1998  2007 DHHS,state law  
North Carolina   2008 NAMI, MHA, state law 
North Dakota 1995   DHHS,NAMI, state law 
Ohio 1979  2007 NCSL,NAMI,state law 
Oklahoma   2000 NCSL,NAMI,BCBS  
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Oregon 2000  2006 NAMI,DHHS,state law 
Pennsylvania 1999   NAMI,DHHS,BCBS  
Rhode Island   1995 All   
South Carolina 1994   BCBS,DHHS,state law 
South Dakota   1998 All   
Tennessee 2000   All   
Texas 1998   NAMI, DHHS,NCSL  
Utah  2001   BCBS,DHHS,NAMI  
Vermont 1977  1998 BCBS,DHHS,NAMI  
Virginia 1998  2000 NCSL,NAMI, BCBS  
Washington 1987  2006 NAMI,DHHS,state law 
West Virginia   2002 NCSL,NAMI,DHHS  
Wisconsin 1988   BCBS,NAMI,state law 
Wyoming    NAMI, DHHS,state law 
   Note: “All” refers to that every source provides same year of enactment.  
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Table A2 
The effect of state and federal mental health parity laws on hourly wages 
 
(1) Log hourly wage (state 
parity) 
(2) Log hourly wage (2010 federal 
parity) 
Parity 0.010  
 (0.009)  
Experimental States×Post  0.008 
  (0.015) 
Age 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Age square -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.247*** 0.222*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) 
Non-white -0.096*** -0.080*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) 
Married 0.095*** 0.105*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
Number of children under 5 0.032*** 0.026*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) 
Less than high school -0.520*** -0.613*** 
 (0.016) (0.020) 
High school -0.334*** -0.374*** 
 (0.006) (0.014) 
Some college -0.225*** -0.262*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) 
Union member 0.131*** 0.109*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) 
Under 25 employees/11 
employees 
-0.198*** -0.201*** 
 (0.006) (0.014) 
Employees 25-99/11-99 -0.118*** -0.130*** 
 (0.005) (0.012) 
Employees 100-499 -0.077*** -0.047*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) 
Employees 501-999 -0.038*** -0.036*** 
 (0.005) (0.013) 
N 194842 36067 
Note: The hourly wage is calculated from information in the CPS on wage and salary income in last year divided 
by weeks worked and hours worked last year. Drop the missing wages and wages less than $1 or more than $400. 
Thus the sample sizes in Table A2 are 0.4% smaller than in Table 2 and 8.  
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Fig. A1. Trends in employment and labor participation for MHPA 
 
 
Fig. A2. Trends in employment and labor participation for MHPA in limited regions 
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Fig. A3. Trends in employment and labor participation for MHPAEA 
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1. Introduction 
     Many children and teenagers in U.S. have mental health challenges that interfere with normal 
functioning and healthy development through the lifespan; an estimated a total of 13%–20% of 
children experience a mental disorder in a given year (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2013). The prevalence of mental illness among children is an important public health 
issue that –when untreated – can deteriorate the welfare of the children themselves, their 
families, and community. One is the worst scenarios is suicide, which can result from the 
interaction of mental disorders and other factors, and was the second leading cause of death 
among children aged 12–17 years in 2010. But due to the shortage of affordable mental health 
care, lack of awareness of mental health care, or the stigma of being labeled by mental illness, it 
is widely believed that only a minority of children receive appropriate mental health services. 
The question of public health insurance’s effectiveness in addressing children’s mental health is 
particularly important because poor children are more likely to suffer from mental health 
problems than non-poor children (Frank and Gertler, 1989; Costello et al, 2003). 
     To improve children’s mental health, their access to mental health care has been increased in 
recent years, both through enactment of mental health mandates in group health insurance and 
expansions in public health insurance that include comprehensive mental health coverage. As the 
largest payer of children’s mental health services, Medicaid provides a safety net for this 
population and plays a critical role in ensuring access to child mental health services. In fact, 
public insurance typically has better coverage for mental health than group health insurance 
plans: it provides a broader range of services from acute hospital services, to psychosocial 
rehabilitation services, to psychotropic medications. The State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) was introduced in 1997 as an important step of public health insurance 
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expansions, and it was designed to reach children with incomes above the traditional Medicaid 
limit; at the same time, many states expanded traditional child Medicaid as well. Both programs 
expanded eligibility – differently across states – throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
     Understanding the effect of public health insurance expansions on mental health of children is 
essential for future policy making, especially after the full implementation of Medicaid 
expansions under the Affordable Care Act. One should note that much of previous literature– 
particular in dealing with mental health outcomes – does not examine children, but adults. Part of 
the contribution of this work is our focus on mental health outcomes of children, who are less 
well-studied in this context. The effectiveness of public health insurance in meeting mental 
health needs may potentially be even more consequential for children than for adults, and 
without treatment, these problems can continue into adulthood; we know, for example, that early 
intervention services for children can have large impacts on future success if caught early 
(National Institute of Mental Health, 2009).  Similarly, mental health challenges that are 
addressed during the teenage years can help keep a young adult from pursuing risky behaviors 
with long-term consequences (Kim-Cohen et al., 2003).  
     In this paper, we utilize the National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF, with cross 
sections in 1997, 1999, and 2002) to investigate the effect of Medicaid/SCHIP expansions on 
children’s coverage, mental health care utilization, and mental health outcomes during this time 
period. The NSAF is nationally-representative with proper weights, but in fact was collected 
primarily in 13 states (the focal states of the “Assessing the New Federalism” (ANF) project at 
the Urban Institute); we use both the full sample and the ANF sample throughout our analysis. 
This paper sets out to establish a series of possible causal relationships, each dependent on the 
last: if Medicaid expansions are to ultimately improve mental health, then they must first 
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generate participation in Medicaid, then utilization of mental health services provided through 
that coverage, and finally improvements in measured mental health as a result of those services. 
Our work here assesses the effectiveness of each of these pathways in turn; this necessarily 
means this paper draws on several streams of literature, each more narrowly focused on 
establishing one of these causal pathways. In this study, we draw this literature together as we 
ask whether expansions in child Medicaid eligibility, combined with the introduction and 
expansion of the State Children’s Health Insurance Plan (SCHIP) for children in near-poor 
families, improve mental health service utilization and, ultimately, mental health outcomes of 
children.  
     The strength of using NSAF is that it provides fundamental information about children’s 
health insurance coverage status and mental health service usage, and also contains rich 
measurements about children’s behavioral and emotional problems: children’s behavioral 
problems index scores. These are created by different questions about children’s daily behavioral 
problems such as feeling depressed, having trouble getting along with other kids, or having sleep 
problems. Even though those measurements are not coming from the professional diagnoses of 
doctors or reports of psychological consultants, they do effectively represent some classic 
symptoms of childhood mental disorders, which are described as changes in the way children 
typically learn, behave, form friendships or handle their emotions (The American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). 
     Our main identification strategy relies on the variation of SCHIP eligibility thresholds for 
different age groups by state by year, thus our results provide estimated effects of raising the 
Medicaid/SCHIP threshold on participation in health insurance coverage, health care utilization, 
and mental health outcomes for the whole sample and the 13 ANF states sample separately. We 
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find that these expansions result in increases in Medicaid/SCHIP participation in the population. 
An increase in the eligibility threshold of 10 percent of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) – for 
example, moving from 190% to 200% FPL –  is associated with a 0.2-0.4 percentage point 
increase in Medicaid/SCHIP coverage (about 1-2 percent of baseline coverage), We also find 
that effects are strongest for children with family income under 300% FPL (as expected) and 
among older children.  
     We also find that raising Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility thresholds leads to meaningful increases 
in several general health care utilization measures such as doctor and emergency room visits. As 
for mental health service usage, the ANF 13-state sample suggests that an increase in 
Medicaid/SCHIP generosity of 10 percent of FPL increases the probability of using mental 
health care for children age 16-17 by nearly 0.2 percentage points. Finally, the effect on most of 
our measurements for general mental health are nearly zero and statistically insignificant in our 
all sample analysis, while there is some evidence of small improvements in our behavioral 
problems index score for children 12-17 in the ANF sample as well as some specific behavioral 
measures in certain age groups.  
     The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we first introduce how Medicaid is 
involved in provision of mental health services, followed by an introduction to different 
expansions of Medicaid during recent decades including enactment of SCHIP. After a review of 
the previous literature in section 3, we use section 4 to illustrate the data source, including the 
descriptive statistics for the sample, the definition and plotted time trends in different outcomes, 
and methodology for analysis. In section 5, the main results are presented. Section 6 concludes 
and describes policy implementation and future plans. 
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2. Medicaid/SCHIP expansions and children’s mental health care 
     As one of the most important public health care programs in US, Medicaid has impacted 
enormously on mental health care for families and individuals with low income and limited 
resources. Since 1980s, Medicaid has expanded the mental health care access and paid for a 
broad range of mental health services. There are two facts we need to know about Medicaid and 
mental health. First, Medicaid is the most important source of funding mental health services, 
there are 46% of state controlled funds for mental health service came from Medicaid in 2008 
(National Alliance of Mental Illness, 2013). Second, children in Medicaid programs can be 
covered by more comprehensive mental health insurance compared with most private insurance 
plans. Except for generous mandated benefits (inpatient care and outpatient care) and optional 
benefits (prescription drugs and rehabilitation), state Medicaid programs should also provide 
Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and the Treatment (EPSDT) because of the provision 
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.  
     Medicaid has been through dramatic expansions in the past two decades. First, the Medicaid 
eligibility has been uncoupled from the eligibility for cash assistance (the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children, or AFDC). In late 1990s, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP) is introduced to expand children’s eligibility higher into the income distribution. There 
is also a gradual expansion of parental Medicaid eligibility during the same time period. By 
increasing income eligibility thresholds and extending the coverage to older children, SCHIP is 
widely considered as the largest expansion of tax-payer funded health insurance coverage for 
children in US since Medicaid was enacted in 1965.  
     SCHIP is a joint federal-state program which can be a Medicaid expansion program, a new 
separate health insurance program for children, or the combination of both. States are given 
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flexibility in designing eligibility criteria and specific program characteristics. Prior to enactment 
of SCHIP, younger children had more generous coverage compare to older ones. For example, 
infants and children under age 6 from families with incomes below 133% of the federal poverty 
level (FPL), while the older ones can only be eligible if their family incomes are lower than 
100% FPL. But as of 2002, more than half of states have rapidly increased eligibility to all 
children up to age 19 at or above 200% FPL through SCHIP. Table 1 presents the comparison of 
initial pre-SCHIP eligibility thresholds (January 1997) and more generous SCHIP thresholds 
(January, 2002). They come from publicly available sources and are all established as a percent 
of FPL. 
     As has occurred with Medicaid, SCHIP is also evolving as an important role in funding public 
mental health care for poor and near-poor children. As for the specific benefit designs and the 
approaches to financing and delivering mental health services, there exist widely variation across 
states (the Urban Institute, 2004). For example, the states that adopt Medicaid expansion 
programs (Minnesota and Wisconsin) have Medicaid-equivalent mental health benefits and 
services, while some other states that establish separate SCHIP programs need subject to more 
mental health benefit limitations. Also, state Medicaid managed care services for children’s 
mental health have different features. Some states have carved out mental health services to fee 
for service (FFS) reimbursement (California and Colorado) just like their physical health 
managed care organization, some states have separate their mental health managed care to other 
special plans (Texas and Washington).  
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Table 1     
Summary of SCHIP expansions, by state and age for year 1997 and 2002 
State % FPL threshold, <6 year old % FPL threshold, ≥6  year old 
 1997 2002 1997 2002 
AK 133 200 100 200 
AL 133 200 100 200 
AR 133 200 100 200 
AZ 133 200 100 200 
CA 133 250 100 250 
CO 133 185 100 185 
CT 185 300 185 300 
DC 133 200 100 200 
DE 100 200 100 200 
FL 133 200 100 200 
GA 100 235 100 235 
HI 133 200 100 200 
IA 133 200 100 200 
ID 133 150 100 150 
IL 133 185 100 185 
IN 133 200 100 200 
KS 133 200 100 200 
KY 100 200 100 200 
LA 133 200 100 200 
MA 200 200 133 200 
MD 185 300 185 300 
ME 133 200 125 200 
MI 150 200 150 200 
MN 275 275 275 275 
MO 100 300 100 300 
MS 133 200 100 200 
MT 133 150 100 150 
NC 133 200 100 200 
ND 133 140 100 140 
NE 133 185 100 185 
NH 185 300 185 300 
NJ 133 350 100 350 
NM 185 235 185 235 
NV 133 200 100 200 
NY 100 200 100 200 
OH 133 200 100 200 
OK 133 185 100 185 
OR 133 170 100 170 
PA 133 200 100 200 
RI 250 250 100 250 
SC 133 150 100 150 
SD 133 200 100 200 
TN 133 400 100 400 
TX 133 200 100 200 
UT 133 200 100 200 
VA 100 200 100 200 
VT 225 300 225 300 
WA 200 250 200 250 
WI 185 185 100 185 
WV 133 200 100 200 
WY 133 133 100 133 
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3. Literature review 
     The first stream of literature that help us to develop our analysis answers the research 
question that do Medicaid expansions increase public health coverage. There is substantial 
evidence that early stage expansions of Medicaid (during the late 1980s and early 1990s) results 
in increased participation in Medicaid itself, both for children and adults (Culter and Gruber, 
1996; Dubay and Kenney, 1996; Shore-Sheppard, 2000; Yazici and Kaestner, 2000; Card and 
Shore-Sheppard; 2004; Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005). Some of the research find substantial 
and significant take-up and crowd-out effect while some of them indicate small or insignificant 
ones.  
     There are also a bunch of empirical studies that estimate the effect of more recent parental 
Medicaid expansions (mid 1990s). Exploiting CPS or SIPP data set and variation in eligibility 
rules, they find that the expansions increase the Medicaid coverage of both parents and children 
(Kronick and Gilmer, 2002; Aizer and Grogger, 2003; Busch and Duchovny, 2005; Sommers 
(2006); Hamersma and Kim, 2013). At last, the relatively recent Medicaid expansion SCHIP has 
been found increase public health insurance as well (Zuckerman et al., 2001; Rosenbach et al., 
2001; Dubay and Kenney, 2003; Lo Sasso and Buchmueller, 2004; Gruber and Simon, 2008;), 
especially for children above the poverty line and children in older age groups. In addition, the 
anti-crowd out provisions of SCHIP may have the positive effect.  
     Because we would like to link the SCHIP/Medicaid coverage to children’s mental health in 
this analysis, thus the second stream of literature is about whether the health insurance coverage 
expansions can improve the health care utilization and health outcomes. Card and Shore-
Sheppard (2004) uses a regression discontinuity approach to study the effect of Medicaid 
expansions to low-income children in specific age ranges and birth cohorts, and they find that the 
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effect on doctor visit is rather large. Parental coverage expansions and SCHIP are also shown to 
have positive but not dramatic effect on access and use of medical and preventive care (Shen and 
Zuckerman, 2005; Currie et al., 2008). As for health outcomes, Currie and Gruber (1996) show 
that the simulated Medicaid eligibility lowers the incidence of infant mortality and low birth 
weight significantly over 1979-1992 period. But the evidence on general health outcomes is still 
limited and mixed (Kaestner et al., 1999; Damiano et al., 2003; Cullen et al., 2005) 
     Medicaid/SCHIP has been designed to provide more comprehensive mental health benefits 
for low-income children compared to private insurance (Frank et al., 2003; Howell et al., 2000; 
Howell, 2004). A few studies offer some explanations for the effect of Medicaid on mental 
health outcomes. Considering income as a function of mental health, Frank and Gertler (1989) 
show that early Medicaid eligibility policy improves poverty caused by the mental illness. 
Cuellar and Markowitz (2007) estimate that the increasing Medicaid spending on psychotropic 
drugs improves several mental health outcomes such as suicide rate (1991-2001) at the state 
level. What is more, capitation arrangements and carve-outs of Medicaid mental health managed 
care generally reduce costs and use of inpatient services.  And relative to FFS, HMO coverage 
reduces the probability of follow-up appointments for children who receive a mental health 
diagnosis while increasing the drug treatment (Hutchinson and Foster, 2003; Turner, 2015). 
     The study most closely related to ours is by Li and Baughman (2011), who use NSAF data 
(1997-2002) to study the effect of the SCHIP income threshold (by state-year-age) on general 
health outcomes (health condition that limits activity). They found that SCHIP significantly 
increase health insurance coverage and well-child doctor visit, but relatively small effect on 
health outcomes. We use a similar strategy to theirs but take advantage of additional variables in 
the NSAF data that they did not explore, bringing our focus to mental health outcomes (not just 
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general health outcomes) and to the role of mental health care utilization. Our study is the first 
empirical study that explore the effect of SCHIP on several children’s mental and behavioral 
health measurements at individual level from national survey data. We also provide new 
empirical evidence on the effect of Medicaid expansion on each pathway from coverage to 
mental health by age groups and poverty levels.  
4. Data and methodology 
4.1 Data source and sample characteristics 
     Our analysis is based on data from the National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF), which 
is one of the components of the Assessing the New Federalism (ANF) Project at the Urban 
Institute. ANF project is designed to better understand the social programs from the federal 
government to the states. And NSAF provides ANF a comprehensive look at quantitative 
measures of children, adults, and their families to explore linkages between state policy and child 
and family well-being, and then help the policy makers to make better decisions. There are three 
rounds of survey in NSAF: 1997, 1999, and 2002. Each round includes household, family, 
person, adult, and child level data. The main data set we exploit for this analysis is the child level 
data which contains information about the sample children in household as well as the “most 
knowledgeable adult” (MKA). MKA is usually the children’s parent or legal guardian who 
response to the survey and report the children’s information.  
     The NSAF draws households from a random-digit dial (RDD) approach (for households with 
telephone) and a supplementary area sample conducted in person (for households without 
telephone) separately. One of the features of NSAF is that the survey oversample low-income 
population in 13 targeted states: Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
119 
 
They represent 87% of the whole sample, the rest is coming from other state to balance the 
nation. These states are called ANF focal states whose social policies are monitored by the Urban 
Institute (Kondaratas et al, 1998), and they account for over half of the U.S. population and have 
a broad array of government programs, fiscal capacity, and child well-being. But with samples 
that balance the nation and appropriate weights, the estimates for the nation as a whole is still 
available.  
     NSAF child level data includes the children who are under 18 years old in the sample 
household, but no more than two children were sampled from each household to reduce the 
respondent burden. If there are multiple children under age 6, one will be randomly selected. The 
same was done for children ages 6 to 17. Thus there are 34439 observations in 1997 wave, 
35,938 observations in 1999 wave, and 34,332 observations for 2002. All MKAs will be asked 
the questions about children’s health coverage, health care usage, health status, behavioral and 
emotional problems. They are our primary sources of outcomes of interest in the following study. 
Besides the demographic characteristics of children and MKA reported in child level data, we 
also combine some other information about the MKA and family from adult pairs and household 
level dataset.  
     Table 2 reports weighted summary statistics for the entire sample, and also compare the 
children with lower than 300% FPL family income and children with higher than 300% FPL 
family income. The first half of the table is about the children, the middle part reports the 
descriptive statistics of their MKAs, and the last three rows show related household 
characteristics. Most of the characteristics are coming from the child level data, while the 
employment status of MKA is merged from adult pair data and all the family information is 
collected from household data. Compared to children from higher income families, the near-poor 
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children have expected features, including higher non-white percentage, lower education levels 
and employment rate of MKAs, and their family have more children. 
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Table 2    
Summary statistics: weighted means (all states)  
 (1) All (2) <300% FPL (3) ≥300% FPL 
Age 8.564 8.324 8.920 
 (0.026) (0.037) (0.042) 
Male 0.512 0.508 0.518 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Hispanic 0.166 0.222 0.081 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Black 0.168 0.220 0.090 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asian or American native 0.060 0.053 0.070 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Biological mother 0.901 0.894 0.912 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Biological father 0.665 0.562 0.817 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
US born 0.959 0.949 0.974 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
MKA age 36.714 35.343 38.752 
 (0.051) (0.063) (0.070) 
MKA female 0.809 0.844 0.757 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
MKA lower than high school 0.166 0.256 0.0323 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
MKA high school 0.569 0.616 0.499 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
MKA bachelor 0.265 0.128 0.468 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
MKA Has a spouse/partner 0.756 0.658 0.900 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
MKA Employment 0.677 0.593 0.802 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Child is living with two parents 0.630 0.524 0.787 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Number of children ages 0-5 0.752 0.859 0.594 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
Number of children ages 6-17 1.672 1.810 1.467 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) 
N 103815 63517 40298 
Note: National level focal child full sample weights are used. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. They are 
calculated by Taylor-linearized variance estimation. Stata commands "svy" are used to adjust for complex survey design. 
Sample used is pooled NSAF focal child 1997, 1999, and 2002. MKA is the most knowledgeable adult. 
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4.2 Trends in insurance, utilization, and mental and behavioral health 
     In this section, we summarize key time trend plots of SCHIP eligibility and outcomes of 
interest used our following empirical analysis. According to these aggregate figures, the basic 
trends of independent and dependent variables from 1997 to 2002 can be observed. Fig. 1 reports 
SCHIP eligibility thresholds and different types of coverage trends for different age groups. 
SCHIP income threshold is linked to microdata by every child’s state, year and age group. In the 
first two panels, children age 6-17 experience a very generous expansions of public health 
insurance and also an increase in Medicaid/SCHIP coverage during these years. Younger kids 
and infants also have moderate increased eligibility and public health insurance coverage but the 
changes are much smaller amount compared to older children. Panel C and Panel D show the 
time trends in private insurance (group and individual insurance) and total health coverage. The 
former decreases while the latter increases especially for older children in 2002. 
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Fig. 1. Trends in SCHIP eligibility thresholds and health insurance coverage 
     Fig. 2 reports the plotted time trends in four different general health care utilization outcomes 
for different age groups. They are number of doctor visit, number of “well-child care” visit, 
number of professional health visit, and number of emergency room visit in past 12 months. 
Every utilization outcome is exclusive from each other. “Well-child care” indicates visits for 
shots or immunizations, annual or other periodic checkups, hearing exams, physicals, and other 
visits for preventive care. Professional medical personnel mean nurse practitioner, physician's 
assistant or midwife visit. According to Fig. 2, the aggregate health care utilization does not 
change substantially during the study period. 
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Fig. 2. Trends in general health care utilization outcomes 
     Fig. 3 presents the plotted time trends in two mental health visit measurements, the first is the 
number of mental health visit, the second is a dummy variable indicates whether the child has at 
least one-time mental health visit during past 12 mouths. The survey questions about mental 
health visit are only for children age 3 or older. Mental health services here include mental health 
services received from a doctor, mental health counselor, or therapist. This figure shows there is 
a small amount of increase in mental health visit and percent of children who have at least one-
time mental health visit from 1997 to 2002. 
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Fig. 3. Trends in mental health care utilization outcomes 
     Except for the use of mental health services among children nationwide, NSAF also provide 
scales to assess the prevalence of emotional and behavioral problem. The main scales we use in 
our analysis are called “behavioral problems index scores for children age 6-11” and “behavioral 
problems index scores for children age 12-17”. Generally speaking, behavioral problems index 
scores are combined by the responses of six questions that concern the MKA`s perceptions about 
the child’s behavior in the past month. For children age 6-11, the six questions in this survey 
follows this order, if it has been often true, sometimes true, or never true for your child during 
the past month: “doesn’t get along with other kids”, “can`t concentrate for long”, “has been sad 
or depressed”, “feels worthless or inferior”, “has been nervous or tense”, and “acts too young for 
his age”. For children age 12-17, their MKAs are asked to response the same first three questions 
and different next three: “has trouble sleeping”, “lies or cheats”, and “does poorly at 
schoolwork”.  
     The response categories included often true (assigned a value of 1), sometimes true (assigned 
a value of 2), and never true (assigned a value of 3). After the responses are totaled, a scale score 
ranging from 6 to 18 has been created. The “never true” means the children have fewer 
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behavioral and emotional problems, thus a higher score indicates better mental health 
outcomes.68 According to the total score, another two indicator measurements are created. One is 
“positive behavior for children age 6-11” when they have full behavioral problems index scores 
(18 points), another is “positive behavior for children age 12-17” when they have full index 
scores. Fig. 4 presents the plotted time trends in these four mental health outcomes. It shows that 
children age 6-11 seem to have more behavioral problems according to MKAs’ report, the 
teenagers have been experienced an improvement of mental health outcomes from 1997 to 1999 
but they decreased again after that.  
 
Fig. 4. Trends in mental health outcomes 
4.3 Econometrics specification 
     Our main approach to measure the impact of Medicaid/SCHIP expansions is developed from 
a model in which the variable of interest is the actual Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility income 
threshold faced by each child. After we link to every observation its threshold by state-year-age 
measured by the percent of FPL, the variation is coming from the extent of the state expands 
                                                          
68 Scores for respondents who answered five out of the six questions were standardized to the 18-point scale. 
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public insurance eligibility over the research period. To control for other determinants and any 
systematic shocks to outcomes of interest that are correlated with, but not due to, the enactment 
of Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility threshold, we use the basic estimating equation as follows: 
                                 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜋𝑗 ∙ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖                          (1) 
     In this equation, the dependent variable  𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is one of the outcomes of health insurance 
coverage, general or mental health care utilization, and mental health outcomes for the child 𝑖 in 
state 𝑗 reported in year 𝑡. 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 is coded as the eligibility threshold (measured in percent 
of FPL) divided by 100 (e.g., for a given age group, state of residence, and year of observation, if 
the threshold is “133 percent of FPL”, it would be coded as a threshold of “1.33”). 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  indexes a 
set of individual level characteristics: child’s age, gender, race, living situation. MKA’s age, 
gender, educational level, employment status, and children number in the household. The 
regression specification includes state fixed effects 𝛾𝑗, to control for any differences across states 
with different expansions in health care and health outcome patterns, and year fixed effects 𝛿𝑡 to 
capture any national trends in health care and health outcomes. It also includes region-by-year 
effects to control for region-specific shocks over this period which are correlated with 
Medicaid/SCHIP expansions.  
     The key coefficient 𝛽1 represents the effect of Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility threshold on the 
outcomes of interest. The estimator can effectively interpret its effect in terms of changing 
thresholds defined by poverty line, and it is straightforward to use this model to consider policy 
proposals for policy makers. We estimate several specifications with linear models, represent the 
effect of Medicaid/SCHIP on every pathway from coverage, mental health care utilization to 
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mental health outcomes. Besides, we estimate this set of equations for different age groups and 
poverty levels by adding their interaction terms SCHIP threshold. 
5. Main Results 
     Our analysis using the NSAF begins with estimating the direct effect of Medicaid/SCHIP on 
health insurance coverage, then moves to the more indirect effect on health care utilization 
(including mental and behavioral health).  We ultimately try to assess whether Medicaid/SCHIP 
can be credited with any improvements in mental health.  We estimated our models using both 
the national sample and the 13-state sample, though at times for brevity we do not report both 
sets of results here (they are available in the Appendix or upon request). Before the report of 
regression results, we present all weighted means of all outcomes of interest in Table 3 for better 
understanding the magnitude of our results. 
Table 3   
Weighted sample means of outcomes of interest 
 (1) All states (2) 13 ANF states 
Panel A: health insurance coverage  
Medicaid/SCHIP 0.212 0.227 
Private insurance 0.679 0.656 
Any insurance 0.887 0.878 
Panel B: general and mental health care utilization 
Doctor visit  2.462 2.481 
Well-child visit 1.218 1.248 
Medical personnel visit 0.846 0.852 
Emergency room visit 0.408 0.374 
Mental health visit 0.555 0.548 
One-time mental visit 0.069 0.065 
Panel C: mental health outcomes  
Age 6-11 index score 16.053 16.031 
Age 6-11 positive behavior 0.308 0.307 
Age 12-17 index score 15.890 15.938 
Age 12-17 positive behavior 0.299 0.311 
N 104709 91029 
  Notes: national and site weights are used separately. 
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A. Coverage 
     There is strong evidence in the NSAF that more generous income thresholds for 
Medicaid/SCHIP coverage (summarized “SCHIP” in the tables and from here forward) results in 
higher levels of coverage for children.  Table 4 indicates that a 10 percent of FPL increase in the 
SCHIP threshold is associated with an estimated .22 percentage point increase in SCHIP 
participation (about 1 percent of baseline coverage of 21 percent).  Columns 2 and 3 provide 
estimated changes in other insurance statuses, but we find there is not conclusive evidence on 
whether the added SCHIP participants have crowded out from private coverage or represent new 
coverage.  At face value, the estimates do suggest possible crowd-out since the estimated 
increase in “any insurance” is much smaller than the SCHIP increase and the estimated decline 
in private insurance is approaching statistical significance (p=0.152).  
     The first row of Table 4 used the whole sample, including many who are certainly ineligible 
for SCHIP (and not near the margin at which they might consider intentionally becoming 
eligible).  To the extent these people are unaffected by SCHIP, they may be diluting its estimated 
effect on the population of interest.  The second and third rows of Table 4 split the sample into 
those who might be influenced by SCHIP and those who almost certainly aren’t, and the results 
confirm our expectations: for lower-income families, SCHIP has larger estimated effects than 
those estimated in the full sample, and for higher incomes families SCHIP appears to be 
inconsequential. 
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Table 4    
The effect of SCHIP on different types of health insurance coverage (all states) 
 (1) Medicaid/SCHIP (2) Private insurance (3) Any insurance (4) N 
Panel A: All     
SCHIP threshold 0.022** -0.012 0.007 103815 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.005)  
Panel B: <300% FPL     
SCHIP threshold 0.031** -0.016 0.011 63517 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.009)  
Panel C: ≥300% FPL     
SCHIP threshold 0.001 0.001 0.003 40298 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)  
Notes: Only the coefficients of interests are reported. All regressions include a full set of demographic controls, year 
dummy variables, state dummy variables, and region by year dummy variables.  National level focal child full sample 
weights are used. Standard errors are calculated by Taylor-linearized variance estimation. PSU and strata variables 
are used in "svy" Stata commands to adjust for complex survey design. SCHIP threshold is measured by 100 percent 
of federal poverty level (FPL). 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
** p < 0.05   
 
     We repeat our analysis using NSAF’s 13-state sample, which accounts for 87% of their 
overall sample in Table 5.  The elimination of states with sparse data seems to improve the 
precision with which we can estimate the effects of the SCHIP threshold on coverage, while (of 
course) limiting the population to which the estimates apply.  For the low-income sample, the 
estimates suggestion that a 10% of FPL increase in the threshold would result in a .61 percentage 
point increase in coverage.  The results for other types of coverage suggest that perhaps half or 
so of this coverage increase is crowd-out from private coverage.  In general, the 13-state 
subsample seems to include states experiencing larger effects of expansions than other states. 
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Table 5    
The effect of SCHIP on different types of health insurance coverage (13 states)  
 (1) Medicaid/SCHIP (2) Private insurance (3) Any insurance (4) N 
Panel A: All   
SCHIP threshold 0.040*** -0.025*** 0.008 90249 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Panel B: <300% FPL  
SCHIP threshold 0.061*** -0.030** 0.019* 54932 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
Panel C: ≥300% FPL  
SCHIP threshold 0.001 -0.012 -0.010* 35317 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
Notes: Observations are restricted to 13 ANF study states. All regressions include a full set of demographic controls, 
year dummy variables, state dummy variables, and region by year dummy variables.  Site level focal child full sample 
weights are used. Standard errors are calculated by Taylor-linearized variance estimation. PSU and strata variables are 
used in "svy" Stata commands to adjust for complex survey design. SCHIP threshold is measured by 100 percent of 
federal poverty level (FPL). 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
    
     Since Medicaid and SCHIP expansions for children have often been applied to specific age 
groups, and since these age groups may have different propensities to take up public coverage 
(for example, if parents are more concerned about children’s coverage at certain ages), we also 
estimate separate effects of SCHIP by age category of the child.  Table 6 shows the estimated 
effects of SCHIP by age group on SCHIP coverage, in both the all-state and 13-state samples for 
both the all-income and low-income subgroups.  (The estimates for high-income subgroups are 
all small and statistically insignificant). 
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Table 6    
The effect of SCHIP on Medicaid/SCHIP coverage  for children in different ages   
 All states 13 NSAF focal states 
 (1) All (2)  <300% FPL (3) All (4) <300% FPL 
     
SCHIP×Age 0-5 0.018 0.028 0.017* 0.031** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.015) 
SCHIP×Age 6-10 0.020* 0.025 0.038*** 0.060*** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013) 
SCHIP×Age 11-15 0.026*** 0.044*** 0.058*** 0.097*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) 0.013 
SCHIP×Age 16-17 0.033*** 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.077*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.020) 
N 103815 63517 90249 54932 
Notes: Only the coefficients of interests are reported. All regressions include full set of demographic controls, year 
dummy variables, state dummy variables, and region by year dummy variables.  National level focal child full sample 
weights are used. Standard errors are calculated by Taylor-linearized variance estimation. PSU and strata variables 
are used in "svy" Stata commands to adjust for complex survey design. SCHIP is measured by 100 percent of federal 
poverty level (FPL). 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
B. Utilization 
     Having established a relationship between SCHIP expansions and participation in coverage, 
we now consider whether the increased public coverage manifested in increased usage of health 
care services. Table 7 indicates positive effects on four measures of utilization available in 
NSAF: doctor visits, well-child visits, visits to other medical personnel, and emergency room 
visits. For example, raising the threshold by 10 percent FPL, the doctor visit time increases 
almost 0.03 time, or increases 1.2 percent according to its mean. Compared to Li and Baughman 
(2011), we use the actual visit numbers for outcome instead of using the probability of visit (any 
visit), and two more measurements are added into the analysis. When we allow for distinctive 
effects by age group, there remains a positive, statistically significant SCHIP effect for all age 
groups for doctor and well-child visits (results available upon request). 
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Table 7     
The effect of SCHIP on general health care utilization (all states) 
 
(1)  
Doctor  
(2)  
Well-child  
(3) 
Medical personnel  
(4)  
Emergency room  
SCHIP threshold 0.290*** 0.290*** 0.076** 0.060** 
 (0.061) (0.036) (0.036) (0.022) 
Age -0.112*** -0.090*** -0.040*** -0.010*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Male 0.010 -0.011 -0.029 0.064*** 
 (0.034) (0.019) (0.020) (0.011) 
Hispanic -0.376*** -0.019 -0.051* -0.007 
 (0.051) (0.035) (0.027) (0.015) 
Black -0.492*** 0.275*** -0.042 0.121*** 
 (0.051) (0.036) (0.030) (0.020) 
Asian or American native -0.261** 0.114 -0.083* 0.038* 
 (0.099) (0.077) (0.049) (0.023) 
US born 0.482*** 0.157*** 0.090* 0.174*** 
 (0.078) (0.046) (0.049) (0.018) 
Biological mother -0.091 -0.031 -0.022 0.009 
 (0.072) (0.037) (0.045) (0.022) 
Biological father -0.254*** -0.174*** -0.113*** -0.112*** 
 (0.072) (0.034) (0.042) (0.026) 
MKA age -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
MKA female 0.432*** -0.113*** -0.001 0.011 
 (0.039) (0.024) (0.025) (0.012) 
MKA Has a spouse/partner -0.207*** -0.104** 0.029 -0.059** 
 (0.066) (0.044) (0.037) (0.026) 
MKA Employment -0.109*** -0.148*** -0.039 -0.061*** 
 (0.038) (0.024) (0.023) (0.012) 
Living with two parents 0.231*** 0.102*** -0.010 -0.047 
 (0.081) (0.037) (0.055) (0.031) 
Number of children ages 0-5 -0.127*** -0.047** -0.056*** -0.024*** 
 (0.033) (0.0210) (0.018) (0.008) 
Number of children ages 6-17 -0.202*** -0.124*** -0.062*** -0.030*** 
 (0.020) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) 
N 103815 103815 103815 103815 
Notes: All regressions include MKA’s educational levels, year dummy variables, state dummy variables, and region by 
year dummy variables. National level focal child full sample weights are used. Doctors are not included in medical 
personnel, it only represents a nurse practitioner, physician's assistant or midwife. All of the utilization outcomes are 
measured by the visit numbers in last year. 
Standard errors in parentheses.     
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01    
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     Table 8 moves to our focus, examining measures of mental health care utilization (both 
number of visits and “any visit”).  In contrast to general health care, we see no evidence of 
increased utilization of mental health care in the full sample.  Moreover, an analysis that breaks 
down the effects by age group and income group does not suggest an effect on any subgroup in 
the population (results available upon request).  
     An examination of the 13-state sample suggests potential stronger effects of SCHIP on 
general health utilization than the full sample (the detailed results are available in Appendix 
Table 1), but still indicates no measurable effects on mental health utilization except for oldest 
age group 16-17. Their possibility of having at least one-time mental health care visit has been 
increased 0.17 percentage point with 10 percent FPL increases in SCHIP threshold. The results 
are shown in Table 9. 
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Table 8   
The effect of SCHIP on mental health care utilization (all states) 
 (1) Mental health visit (2) Any mental health visit 
SCHIP threshold -0.015 0.001 
 (0.080) (0.006) 
Age 0.027*** 0.004*** 
 (0.006) (0.001) 
Male 0.158*** 0.018*** 
 (0.037) (0.003) 
Hispanic -0.127** -0.019*** 
 (0.048) (0.005) 
Black -0.371*** -0.027*** 
 (0.056) (0.006) 
Asian or American native -0.173*** -0.010 
 (0.063) (0.007) 
US born 0.401*** 0.034*** 
 (0.046) (0.005) 
Biological mother -0.827*** -0.053*** 
 (0.118) (0.007) 
Biological father -0.836*** -0.055*** 
 (0.124) (0.009) 
MKA age 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.000) 
MKA female 0.116*** 0.016*** 
 (0.042) (0.004) 
MKA Has a spouse/partner 0.039 -0.001 
 (0.073) (0.007) 
MKA Employment -0.228*** -0.019*** 
 (0.043) (0.003) 
Child is living with two parents 0.103 -0.014 
 (0.136) (0.010) 
Number of children ages 0-5 -0.051* -0.006** 
 (0.027) (0.002) 
Number of children ages 6-17 0.036* 0.004*** 
 (0.019) (0.001) 
N 86947 86947 
Notes: All regressions include MKA’s educational levels, year dummy variables, state dummy variables, 
and region by year dummy variables. National level focal child full sample weights are used. The 
utilization outcomes are measured by the visit numbers in last year. "One-time mental health visit" 
means there was at least one mental health visit last year. Observations are restricted to children 3 years 
of age or older. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Table 9: 
The effect of SCHIP on mental health care utilization (13 states) 
 (1) (2) 
 Mental health visit Any mental health visit 
SCHIP threshold -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.048) (0.006) 
For different age groups  
SCHIP×Age 0-5 -0.132 -0.007 
 (0.082) (0.006) 
SCHIP×Age 6-10 0.013 0.002 
 (0.066) (0.005) 
SCHIP×Age 11-15 0.037 0.006 
 (0.060) (0.006) 
SCHIP×Age 16-17 0.098 0.017* 
 (0.087) (0.009) 
For different poverty levels  
SCHIP -0.045 0.001 
 (0.047) (0.005) 
SCHIP×Less than 300% FPL 0.078 0.002 
 (0.059) (0.005) 
N 75584 75584 
Notes: Only the coefficients of interests are reported. All regressions include full set of demographic controls, year 
dummy variables, state dummy variables, and region by year dummy variables.  Site level focal child full sample weights 
are used. The utilization outcomes are measured by the visit numbers in last year. "One-time mental health visit" means 
there was at least one mental health visit last year. Observations are restricted to children 3 years of age or older. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1 
 
 
 
C. Mental Health Outcomes 
     Although our estimates suggest that SCHIP coverage may not have contributed to increased 
mental health care utilization, there is always the possibility that even small effects on utilization 
could have impacts on outcomes.  The NSAF has several measures of mental and behavioral 
health outcomes for children.  Table 7 provides estimated effects of SCHIP on a behavioral index 
(ranging in values from 6 to 18, where larger indices indicate more positive behaviors) as well as 
a binary variable indicating consistent positive behaviors (index is 18 or not).  The survey has 
separate index measurement methods for 6-11 and 12-17 year-old children, so we separate them 
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in this model.  Panel A of the table 10 provides the main estimates as well as estimates with an 
interaction with an indicator for “less than 300% FPL” in case effects differ across income 
groups.  In all case, there is no measureable effect on outcomes.   
     Moving to the 13-state sample does not change the conclusions much (see Table 10, Panel B), 
but there is some small indication of behavioral improvements (when measured as a binary 
variable) – the fourth column indicates that an increase in SCHIP eligibility thresholds of 10 
percent of FPL would generate a .27 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of 
“positive behavior” for 12-17 year olds, on a base of 30 percent, resulting in about a 1% 
improvement.  The results for 6-11 year olds are more puzzling, as precise estimation only 
occurs in estimates that distinguish the SCHIP effects on higher-income and lower-income 
children; the improvement (a little over 1%) appears to apply only to higher-income children.  It 
is possible that SCHIP generates improvements for eligible children that we fail to measure here 
that have spillovers onto higher-income students.  For instance, we know that disruptive peers 
can have a causal effect on the classroom behavior of children otherwise not as prone to behavior 
problems (Figlio, 2007). If SCHIP reduces the disruptiveness of participating children, it may 
have spillovers that show up in our index for higher-income children.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 
 
 
Table 10 
    
The effect of SCHIP on behavioral problems index score for children in different poverty levels  
 (1) Age 6-11 (2) Age 6-11 (3) Age 12-17 (4) Age 12-17 
 Index score Positive behavior Index score Positive behavior 
Panel A: All states     
SCHIP -0.006 0.017 0.007 0.022 
 (0.095) (0.017) (0.091) (0.022) 
SCHIP -0.043 0.019 0.046 0.033 
 (0.088) (0.019) (0.091) (0.026) 
SCHIP×Less than 300% FPL 0.064 -0.004 -0.071 -0.020 
 (0.064) (0.015) (0.072) (0.017) 
N 32897 32897 32648 32648 
     
Panel B: 13 states     
SCHIP 0.007 0.014 0.078 0.027* 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.071) (0.014) 
SCHIP 0.049 0.035** 0.051 0.027 
 (0.076) (0.017) (0.073) (0.018) 
SCHIP×Less than 300% FPL -0.082 -0.041** 0.056 0.001 
 (0.059) (0.016) (0.074) (0.017) 
N 28593 28593 28398 28398 
Notes: Only the coefficients of interests are reported. All regressions include full set of demographic controls, year 
dummy variables, state dummy variables, and region by year dummy variables.  Appropriate focal child full sample 
weights are used. The behavior index is a scale score ranging from 6 to 18. Higher score indicates better mental health. 
Positive behavior is an indicator for an index score of 18. Observations are limited to children 6 years of age or older. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1 
 
     As we mentioned earlier in data source, the behavioral problems index scores combine 
information from six behavioral questions: “doesn’t get along with other kids,” “can’t 
concentrate for long,” and “has been sad or depressed.” For each of these, a higher index show 
that the children are never experiencing this situation recently, thus it indicates better outcomes. 
Children age 6-11 and age 12-17 both share the answers of three questions, although there is no 
substantial effect on especially for whole national sample, it is still possible that SCHIP only 
impact on some of the specific measurements instead of their general total.  Fortunately, NSAF 
also has variables that document potentially disruptive behaviors as well as emotional problems.   
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     Table 11 provides the all-state sample estimated effects of SCHIP on indices for these 
separately questions. While the overall estimated effect is not statistically distinguishable from 
zero, there is at least some evidence that SCHIP may improve behavioral health outcomes for 16-
17 year olds. For example, when there is an increase 10 percent in SCHIP threshold, the score of 
“can’t concentrate for long” can be increased by 0.004 points. The full score is 3 and the average 
point is 2.528, this can be translated into 0.16 percent of increase compared to the baseline. 
However, when we focus on the 13-state sample in Table 12, the more substantial effects seem to 
be on younger children.  This is surprising given the fact that the 13-state sample contains about 
87 percent of the same people as the all-state sample, and again suggests that the subsample may 
have different patterns of response to SCHIP expansions. In both samples, we see no 
improvement in the depression index.  We also do not find differential responsiveness by poverty 
group. 
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Table 11    
The effect of SCHIP on several specific behavior and emotional problems (all states) 
 (1) Doesn’t get along  (2) Can’t concentrate  (3) Has been sad for  
 with other kids  for long depressed 
SCHIP threshold 0.011 0.027 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) 
For different age groups   
SCHIP×Age 6-10 0.006 0.027 -0.015 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) 
SCHIP×Age 11-15 0.010 0.022 -0.0003 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) 
SCHIP×Age 16-17 0.033* 0.041* -0.005 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) 
For different poverty levels   
SCHIP 0.016 0.025 -0.002 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) 
SCHIP×Less than 300% FPL -0.007 0.004 -0.008 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) 
N 65760 65757 65706 
Notes: Notes: Only the coefficients of interests are reported. All regressions include full set of demographic controls, 
year dummy variables, state dummy variables, and region by year dummy variables.  Site level focal child full 
sample weights are used. The scores (ranging from 1-3 points) of behavior and emotional questions are used to 
create index scores. Higher point indicates better mental health. Observations are limited to children 6 years of age 
or older. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1 
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Table 12 
The effect of SCHIP on several specific behavior and emotional problems (13 states) 
 (1) Doesn’t get along  (2) Can’t concentrate  (3) Has been sad for  
 with other kids  for long depressed 
SCHIP threshold 0.018 0.019 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) 
For different age groups   
SCHIP×Age 6-10 0.027* 0.029* -0.006 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) 
SCHIP×Age 11-15 0.010 0.011 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
SCHIP×Age 16-17 0.015 0.015 0.008 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) 
For different poverty levels   
SCHIP 0.017 0.024 -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
SCHIP×Less than 300% FPL 0.0003 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
N 57173 57171 57133 
Notes: Only the coefficients of interests are reported. All regressions include full set of demographic controls, year 
dummy variables, state dummy variables, and region by year dummy variables.  Site level focal child full sample 
weights are used. The scores (ranging from 1-3 points) of behavior and emotional questions are used to create index 
scores. Higher point indicates better mental health. Observations are limited to children 6 years of age or older. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implication 
     This paper presents new empirical evidence of the effect of SCHIP expansions on public 
health insurance participation and; general health care utilization, with a special focus on mental 
health care utilization and mental and behavioral health outcomes of children. There have 
already been numerous studies that establish the impact of different Medicaid expansions on 
public insurance coverage and general medical care service usages and health outcomes, but their 
effect on mental health care utilization and mental health outcomes is relatively less-studied. 
This study about children’s mental health adds to previous literature about Medicaid and is 
essential for future policy making, because the full implementation of the ACA expands 
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Medicaid and includes mental health benefits as one of ten essential health benefits for all types 
of health plans.  
     Our main finds are coming from the national sample and 13 ANF states sample of the NSAF, 
both of which show positive and significant effect on Medicaid/SCHIP coverage and general 
health care utilization if we raise the SCHIP eligibility thresholds; most of the gain in coverage 
comes from poor and near poor children (less than 300% FPL) and older children (age older than 
6). As for mental health care utilization and general mental health outcomes, statistically 
significant evidence only comes from the ANF 13-state sample for some age groups; the national 
sample only provides suggestive evidence on one specific mental health measurement.  
     To the extent mental health outcomes may not be very affected, this analysis can help us 
begin to explore whether this is due to a lack of increase in coverage, a lack of increase in 
utilization, or a failure for utilization to translate into mental health improvements. Thus to better 
understand how to transfer the eligibility expansions to achievement of mental health 
improvement, our next extension of this work will also incorporate policy data on the type of 
delivery system used for SCHIP expansions to further understand the program features that may 
lead Medicaid/SCHIP expansions to successfully generate improved child mental health. For 
example, Medicaid in some states is implemented as a managed care arrangement, while in 
others is a traditional fee-for-service. Certain structures may be more amendable to successfully 
translating coverage into utilization. 
     We also will consider the possible variation in effects when a program expands by different 
means: states may have increases in child eligibility via expansion of Medicaid itself or 
expansion through SCHIP (or a combination of the two).  The nature of these expansions can 
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mean different limitations on coverage for mental health services, the effects of which we plan to 
explore. In addition, we will ask whether parental Medicaid expansions (independently of child 
expansions) improve mental health utilization and outcomes of children– a possible spillover 
effect, since increased parental coverage that may lead to increased child coverage even if child 
eligibility is unchanged. With these expansions, our study can provide even more helpful 
findings about how to directly link the Medicaid threshold to the relevant implementation issues 
(like the nature of expansion and delivery methods) that may help drive program effectiveness to 
improve the mental health conditions for children, and better intervene for their healthy 
development in the future.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
Appendix: 
Table A1:     
The effect of SCHIP on general health care utilization (13 states) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Doctor  Well-child  Medical personnel  Emergency room  
SCHIP threshold 0.462*** 0.468*** 0.150*** 0.035*** 
 (0.058) (0.033) (0.033) (0.012) 
For different age groups    
SCHIP×Age 0-5 0.537*** 0.889*** 0.308*** -0.050** 
 (0.089) (0.056) (0.056) (0.021) 
SCHIP×Age 6-10 0.411*** 0.404*** 0.096*** 0.007 
 (0.063) (0.036) (0.034) (0.014) 
SCHIP×Age 11-15 0.444*** 0.386*** 0.123*** 0.016 
 (0.067) (0.039) (0.042) (0.017) 
SCHIP×Age 16-17 0.308*** 0.368*** 0.135*** 0.015 
 (0.092) (0.041) (0.047) (0.021) 
For different poverty levels    
SCHIP 0.398*** 0.423*** 0.119*** 0.037** 
 (0.070) (0.037) (0.037) (0.014) 
SCHIP×Less than 300% FPL 0.117* 0.083** 0.055* -0.003 
 (0.065) (0.031) (0.032) (0.012) 
N 90249 90249 90249 90249 
Notes: Only the coefficients of interests are reported. All regressions include full set of demographic controls, year dummy 
variables, state dummy variables, and region by year dummy variables.  Site level focal child full sample weights are used. 
Doctors are not included in medical personnel, it only represents a nurse practitioner, physician's assistant or midwife. All 
of the utilization outcomes are measured by the visit numbers in last year. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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